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Introduction 
lU 
INTRODUCTION 
With the globalization of the containment policy, 
US got seriously engaged in the security affairs of South 
Asia. In all these V'ears the predominant characteristics 
of the US security assistance has been its support for 
strategies closely linked to the Cold War issues and the 
American- Soviet confrontation in Europe and the Third 
World. 
Since India was not prepared to be a satellite or a 
client of the US, the latter found in Pakistan a 
manageable ally. To offset the expansionist policies of 
the USSR and the Peoples Republic of China, the United 
States foresaw in the geographical location of Pakistan 
evident strategic advantages in meeting these supposed 
threats. Pakistan -geostrategic significance in the 
fulfilment of US oil interests in the Persian Gulf and the 
extension of its political influence in Middle East, South 
West Asia and South Asia were other important 
considerations in the thinking of American policy-makers. 
Thinking in Pakistan, however, was guite different 
from that of the USA. Infact, the Indian sub-continent 
wherein seven sovereign nations are located is dominated 
by India with its central location, larger size, 
population and vast resources. That other nations of the 
sub-continent are relatively so small as compared to 
India, that spontaaeous feeling of a fear of India's 
domination haunts with varying degrees of intensity. 
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Pakistan, which perceives a threat from India to its very 
existence is, perhaps the worst affected by such fears. It 
was in order to counter these threats, particularly of an 
impending Indian invasion to destroy Pakistan, the latter 
has been desperate in its efforts to establish a fair 
degree of parity in its military power vis-a-vis India, 
mainly with the help of military aid and assistance from 
Western powers particularly the US. Thus both needed each 
other, though with divergent policy perception and 
orientation. 
The quest for acquisition of superior weapons in 
qualitative and quantitative terms by one country can only 
lead to an arms race and which in turn increases the 
probability of war. It is this dangerous trend of Pakistan 
trying to acquire highly sophisticated weapons which is 
cause of major concern to India and it poses a grave 
threat to India's security. 
Keeping this centrality of the policy framework in 
view, this study attempts to examine the factors which 
compelled Pakistan to acquire sophisticated arms from the 
US and to analyse their implications on Indian security. 
The whole study, for the sake of convenience, has been 
divided into four chapters, besides a summary of all 
discussion and future prospects in the form of conclusion. 
The first chapter attempts to analyse the various 
compulsions and complexities involved in the US military 
aid diplomacy as instrument of foreign policy in Cold War 
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context. Giving the example of U.S.-Pakistan alliance 
relationship, it explains how a donor country exercises 
influence over the recipient and vice versa. 
The second chapter tries to present an overview of 
the evolution of US-Pakistan alliance relationship in 
historical perspective, focusing how Pakistan skilfully 
used the various situations inherent in Cold War for 
acquiring massive security assistance from the USA. It 
also gives a resume of US military aid to Pakistan till 
April 1979 when all' US assistance was terminated under 
Symington- Glenn Amendment. 
The third chapter endeavours to analyse how the 
past deterioration in the security relationship between 
the USA and Pakistan, due to latter's nuclear weapons 
programme, came in for reappraisal in the wake of fall of 
Shah of Iran and the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan's geostrategic significance as 
relatively a stable factor had cast it again into the main 
focus of the U.S South Asian policy. It also portrays how 
President Zia-ul Haq's bargaining position increased on 
account of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and how 
cleverly he managed to secure the two heavy doses ($3.2 
billion and $4.02 billion) of US military aid along with 
sophisticated weapons including F-16 fighters. This 
chapter begins with the resumption of the US security 
assistance to Pakistan in 1981 and ends with the 
termination of all assistance in October 1990 on account 
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of latter's renewed nuclear weapons programme, under 
Pressler Amendment. 
The fourth chapter deals in detail with 
implications on India's security of Pakistan being armed 
by the Western powers especially the USA. It also throws 
some light on issues like concept of national security and 
India's threat perceptions. It attempts to find out 
whether Pakistani threat to India's security is real or 
merely a rhetoric of political leaders to divert the 
attention of the masses from the more acute domestic 
problems. A summary of all these discussions have been 
given in conclusion with future prospects. 
Methodology : This study follows the historical, 
descriptive and analytical approach for the understanding 
of the US military aid policy towards Pakistan and its 
impact on India's security. Efforts have been made to 
collect all the relevant data and interpret it both in 
historical perspective and from the point of current 
relevance. All source material is library based. Most of 
the library data came from libraries in India specially 
J.N.U Library, I.D.S.A Library, Sapru House- I.C.W.A 
Library, (All Delhi based) and M.A. Library, AMU Aligarh. 
Upto possible extent effort has been made to rely 
mostly on primary sources viz government publications of 
the USA, Pakistan and India. This, along with the other 
relevant work done by scholars belonging to USA, Pakistan 
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and India, was used to put into perspective the issue 
under study. This work attempts to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the issues under study within the broad 
frame-work of the problem of peace and security in South 
Asia. 
Chapter -1 
U.S. Military Aid 
Diplomacy 
U.S. MILITARY AID DIPLOMACY 
Acquiring arms was one of man's highly valued 
endeavours even during the times of his most primitive 
existence. Arms seemed to assure him of his security and 
survival and also gave him the power and authority to 
influence and dominate others. Man's long spread 
evolutionary transformation from his primitive state to a 
more cultured and civilized world from a nomadic existence 
to organised social and communal living, has not brought 
about any fundamental changes, either in his instincts for 
security survival and domination, or in the manifestation 
of such instincts through the endeavour to acquire arms. 
Of course, the form and magnitude of this endeavour have 
undergone radical changes. The arms are now varied and 
better sharpened, thanks to the ongoing technological 
advances. The arsenal are huge and deadly. The expressed 
purpose is no longer individual safety alone but "national 
security" - a vague and some what mystical concept that is 
highly susceptible to various and subjective inter-
pretations. 
a.Military Aid: A Perception 
Prior to a discussion on Military aid as Foreign 
Policy instrument it is necessary to understand what 
infact is meant by Military Aid. The term is commonly used 
in the context of military transaction between the donor 
and recipient countries respectively, whether they are in 
the form of (a) grant/aid (b) credit or (c) cash. The 
ambiguous nature of various arms transactions, makes it 
difficult to define "the exact boundaries of these terms. 
Military aid /assistance includes outright gifts of 
military hardware; sale of select items of weapons systems 
and military equipment at concessional rates; supplies on 
a no-profit no-loss basis, or at market rates or may be 
considered, appropriate by aid givers for the particular 
occasion. Military assistance also includes lending or 
leasing of equipment -"lease" on a non-rental or very 
nominal rental basis as in the case of the U.S. Ueased' 
submarine ^Ghazi' to Pakistan at near market rates as in 
the case of the leasing of a squadron of 24-F4 fighter 
bombers to Australia.' 
Yet other categories of aid are the training of 
military personnel of aid receiving countries in the donor 
country a variant of this is for the donor country to 
establish training centres in the recipient country. Other 
aspects are the building of military-administrative 
infrastructures such as air fields and roads, port and 
warehousing facilities, repair installations and, above 
all, communication facilities including air defence ground 
environmental facilities. More sophisticated forms of aid 
are reserved generally for countries in the middle level 
or those Who have the ability to negotiate with donors 
otherwise than as dependents would include technological 
assistance to develop their own arms industries. This 
could be by the sale of designs, process details and other 
manufacturing data as well as supply of machinery and 
plant for the manufacture of particular items of 
equipment as also in some cases of certain essential semi-
finished material and" sub-assemblies. 
Military aid in this comprehensive sense is 
practised and is affordable only by the super powers. In 
the case of the lesser powers, who are highly 
industrialized and traditionally had thriving arms 
industries of their own, arms aid, except perhaps 
marginally, would mean arms sales. Even so there would be 
political overtones to arms transactions undertaken by 
these middle powers. Britain, France and West Germany are 
examples of this class of powers. Traditionally natural 
powers , e.g. Sweden and Switzerland have the competence 
to build sophisticated military equipment and supply such 
equipment to other countries. In their case the 
transactions are more or less on a purely commercial 
basis. 
The process of military aid and trade can be 
divided in three broad categories, first, between the 
developed countries, both allied and friendly, primarily 
because one of them is not producing a particular 
weapon/weapon system or because of inadequate domestic 
production. Second, between developed and developing 
countries, as the latter lack an industrial base, the 
technological know-how and the capital to establish 
domestic arms industries. Third, amongst the developing 
countries, as some of the developing countries have 
established domestic arms industries and have become 
supplier of arms to other lesser developed countries. 
The super powers arms transactions with 
industrialised nations are regulated by the status of the 
latter within alliance systems. For example, the U.S. has 
for historical and other reasons, very close and cordial 
relations with Britain to whom it even transfers nuclear 
know-how. In fact it was the special Anglo-American 
relationship that gave rise to French misgivings and 
France's development of an independent deterrent and its 
dissociation with NATO nuclear planning. West Germany and 
Japan were completely disarmed at the end of world war II. 
Their industries were in ruins and their most urgent task 
was reconstruction. They needed peace. Hence for them 
American protection and economic assistance were valuable. 
Similarly, when super powers gave some military aid to the 
developing countries latter's strategic importance was 
important factor of their consideration. In case of U.S. 
Military aid to Pakistan, the former used Pakistan as base 
to check the expansion of former Soviet Union in Soutn 
West Asia. 
The demand and supply of weapons is influenced by 
national and international compulsions. Quest for security 
is an important factor in every country's national 
objectives . It can be achieved through diplomacy, foreign 
policy and alliances or through a viable defence force. 
or may be a combination of all these. The perception of 
threat is a vital element of consideration in the 
recipients calculation to acquire arms. Other important 
factors are: political pressure, historico-military 
tradition, inter-service rivalry, modernization of forces, 
requirements of these forces, domestic and economic 
conditions, technical capability, ability to maintain 
weapons and acquisition of arms to enhance national 
prestige and to increase its diplomatic weightage. 
The second set of variables is contingent upon the 
international environment which influence the decision of 
the suppliers. The supply of military equipment from 
developed to developing countries is generally recognised 
to have three basic motivations- strategic, political and 
commercial. The transfer of arms from one country to 
another is itself an expression of the state of political 
relationship between the two countries. Unlike in the case 
of normal commercial relationship transfer of arms from 
one country to another with whom its relationship is not 
cordial or at the most normal, is not likely. Within the 
foreign policy framework of the donor,its choice of the 
strategic areas, countries and bases is important. 
Therefore countries transfer arms and provide 
military aid for strategic considerations, when they feel 
that the defence and security of the recipient country is 
of vital concern to their own natural security. Political 
consideration led to transfer of military equipment to 
other countries, when it is felt that the political 
developments in those countries will have to be influenced 
in a particular direction by induction of such military 
equipment and other military support, though there may be 
no security threat to the transferring countries 
concerned, nor the development relating to the security of 
the recipient country may have any direct bearing on that 
of the donor country. 
b.Influence Through Arms 
Arms suppliers or military aid donors exercise 
influence over recipient in a variety of ways. This 
influence can be predicted on the nature of dependence 
relationship between a recipient and a supplier. 
Consistent with Albert Hirschman's view on influence 
through trade, the leverage that country A acquire over 
country B through arms supply may depend upon the total 
gain that B derives from the trade, which is equivalent , 
in turn, to the total impoverishment that would be 
inflicted upon it by a stoppage of the trade. Arms 
dependence can constitute one element of a country's non-
autonomy in its relationship with the supplier nations. It 
arises from a situation where the defence programme of one 
country is significantly determined by the policymakers of 
another country. External dependence for arms can 
vary with the intensity of a regional conflict and with 
the size of the state involved in the conflict. Small 
states, thus, with serious external threats are likely to 
be more dependent on" supplier nations and, in turn, more 
susceptible to attempt at influence. During cold war era, 
countries that were closely affiliated with the military 
bloc under either superpower bore constraints in 
approaching supplier nations from the rival bloc, which 
often forced them to be dependent on a limited number of 
weapon sources. 
Countries that are involved in intense regional 
conflicts but that possess limited defence infrastructure 
invariably tend to be dependent upon outside suppliers for 
the sophisticated weapon systems they need. Developing 
countries keen to arm with the latest generation of 
weapons often monopolized by a few producing nations-could 
also have a high level of dependence on supplier states. 
Dependence can be higher if the recipient does not pay for 
the weapons in cash and has to rely on supplier grants or 
loans. 
Another important factor is whether the recipient 
is involved in a crisis , or war, and therefore urgently 
needs to shore up its inventory. Attempts at exerting 
influence may not succeed in such context, unless the 
recipient has no other weapon sources. Supplier attempts 
at decisional influ.ence can take the form of denying 
promised arms shipments and placing restrictions on spare 
parts to force modification of a recipient's specific 
political behaviour. Arms embargoes fall under this 
category. Embargoes can be effective if the recipient is 
solely dependent on a particular supplier or is in urgent 
need of a particular weapon that only one supplier can 
provide. At structural and decisional levels, 
recipients could also exert reverse influence over 
suppliers. This was especially prevalent during the heyday 
of the Cold War. Reverse influence arose from the 
structural conflicts in which the superpowers had been 
engaging. The East-West rivalry demanded superpower 
reliance on recipient nations for political as well as for 
material support, even while the U.S. and the former 
Soviet Union possessed immense military and economic 
prowess. A recipient's strategic leverage resulted when 
arms were traded for substantial return benefits such as 
base facilities or when the supplier had a high stake in 
maintaining good relations with the recipient to promote 
its global or regional interests. Thus, a country's 
strategic and geographic significance in the superpower 
competition enhanced its reverse leverage, especially if 
the concerned superpower had few other supports in the 
region. In many cases, membership in alliances with the 
super powers increased the leverage of smaller powers. 
Robert Keohane cites several instances where lesser allies 
were able to use alliance relationship to influence U.S. 
policy perspective through formal bargaining, by 
developing close working relationship with the agencies of 
the U.S. government, and by setting out to influence 
public opinion and private interest groups.^ such attempts 
at domestic influence by smaller allies also affected the 
U.S. arms transfer policy towards these states. An 
activist, zero-sum foreign policy posture by the U.S. or 
the Soviet Union was another determinant of the level of 
influence that they could exert on regional powers. If the 
superpowers needed to make their presence felt in a 
particular region, smaller allies would become important 
partners in that effort. The active, anti-Communist 
foreign policy posture of several administrations forced 
the United States to pay more attention to the Soviet 
threat than to the actions of its regional allies. The 
strategic importance of smaller allies also varied with 
significance and level of regional conflicts and the 
superpower stakes in those conflicts. The U.S. also feared 
that regime or regional instability could result in Moscow 
enhancing its influence in such regions, and consequently 
lent its support to many nondemocratic regimes. 
However, with the demise of the cold war and the 
end of bipolarity, major structural changes occurred in 
the international system. The Soviet Union no longer 
exists as a single unified state capable of providing 
support to erstwhile allies. The end of the bipolar 
competition also signalled the decline of the reverse 
influence that smaller allies could derive from their 
relationship with the superpowers. This has serious 
repercussions that could influence patterns, although the 
impact may be countervailed by other new conditions in the 
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international arms trade such as the emergence of new 
suppliers like China as serious contenders to traditional 
Western sources. The pattern of regional conflicts are 
also undergoing changes, with proxy war becoming things 
of the past. Western attempts to control the flow of 
advanced weaponry such as missiles, as embodied in the 
missile control regime, may further limit the developing 
countries access to m"odern technology in the coming years. 
C.U.8.- Pakistan case 
The U.S.-Pakistan arms relationship shows the 
successes and failures in supplier influence through arms 
transfers, especially at the height of the cold war. 
However, Pakistan's near total dependence on U.S. weapons 
and its own less-developed domestic armament manufacturing 
capabilities made it vulnerable to U.S. structural 
influence. Despite these constraints, Pakistan succeeded 
in obtaining many modern weapon systems from the U.S. ; 
this was largely because of structural factors, the U.S.-
Soviet zero-sum rivalry in the region until the late 1980s 
being the most prominent. 
The period of the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan provided a test case of how arms transfers 
worked as an instrument of structural and decisional 
influence in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. The 
Afghanistan crisis dramatically altered the U.S. policy 
towards Pakistan, which suddenly became the most important 
country in the region for the containment of the Soviet 
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Union in the resurgent Cold War climate. Pakistani leaders 
attempted quite successfully to use their country's newly 
acquired strategic importance to influence U.S. decision-
makers, especially regarding arms and economic aid as quid 
pro quo for supporting the Mujahideen forces fighting the 
Soviet -backed Kabul regime. The rejection of President 
Carter's initial aid offer was a calculated move on the 
Pakistani side to influence Washington to provide greater 
military and economic assistance. 
However, the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan, the 
end of the Cold-War, and the eventual break up of the USSR 
changed global politics so dramatically that the strategic 
environment in the region also underwent major 
alterations. Pakistan's significance for the U.S. as a 
strategic partner declined considerably. There was no 
longer a need for a pipeline of weapon supplies to the 
Afghan resistance groups. 
The U. S.-Pakistan attempts at mutual influence 
through an arms transfer relationship has some theoretical 
and policy implications. First, great powers can develop a 
certain anount of structural influence vis-a-vis smaller 
allies through arms transfer, especially if the smaller 
partners are heavily dependent on them. Second, influence 
is rarely a one-way street, as the U.S.-Pakistani case 
illustrates, A weaker ally may develop reverse structural 
influence if the great power patron is engaged in a bitter 
struggle with its opponent. The strategic significance of 
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the smaller ally is a key determinant in this respect. 
Arms transfer tend to provide only a limited amount of 
decisional influence, to suppliers, especially on issue 
areas such as security that involve high stakes for the 
recipients. Washington's failure to influence 
significantly Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme attests 
to this conclusion. 
d.Military Aid as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy 
Many instruments exist by means of which the great 
powers create allies. Security assistance has become an 
important instrument in this context. Security assistance 
including arms aid and arms sale, no doubt, has now become 
an important and pivotal sub-system in the existing set of 
multiple relations among nations. It has formed the basis, 
to a very great extent of the contemporary international 
power and diplomacy. 
Military aid is a many sided phenomenon. It covers 
extensive areas and is designed to secure a wide variety 
of policy objectives. In the post World War II era, 
military aid policies and programmes of great powers have 
been major elements in the diplomacy of alliances and 
bloc. 
Historically, the U.S. security assistance 
programme has always been regarded by the policy-makers as 
a significant tool promoting the country's foreign policy 
objectives. The issue of security of the U.S. and its 
allies, preservation of American interests globally and 
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the maintenance of its superpower status have been the 
corner-stone of the U.S. foreign policy during the post 
second World War era. Thus, the predominant characteristic 
of the U.S. military aid has been its support closely 
linked to the Cold-War issues and the American-Soviet 
confrontation. During the last five decades after the 
second World War, American economic and military aid 
totalling $ 390 billion have supported over 100 countries 
in order to preserve the U.S. foreign policy interests all 
over the world, the core of which was to contain the 
threat of the Soviet-style communism posed to the key 
allies of the U.S. Even non-military aid has tended to 
flow to nations that were viewed as counter weights to the 
expansion of communism. 
Testifying before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on June 26, 1968, the then U.S. Defence Secretary 
Clark-Clifford, observed: "The Foreign Military Sales Act 
will retain all the present controls. In addition it will 
establish further restraints specially to ensure that the 
military sales programmes will continue to be fully and 
responsively a sound instrument of foreign policy".^ 
This was further elucidated by Assistant Defence 
Secretary, Paul Warnke, who on the same occasion 
testified:" our business is to use the military sales and 
military grant programmes to implement the foreign policy 
of the united states. We are not in the business of 
selling arms or providing arms just for the sake of 
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providing arms."^ On a previous occasion-Assistant 
Secretary of Defence Paul Nitze had described the 
interaction between U.S. arms sales and foreign policy in 
these terms: "our entire arms policy is infact an accurate 
reflection of considered agreement at the highest levels 
of authority"^ This emphasises the fact that no arms 
transaction-sale, lease or gift is decided upon, except in 
the context of the donor country's foreign policy 
objectives and goals. 
Military assistance, according to a Congressional 
record, consists of "military equipment, training and 
related services to help nations protect themselves 
against external attack or internal subversion." It was 
given largely to those nations situated on the periphery 
of the Communist empire (or empires) , whose need for 
protection against aggression and subversion is obvious. 
Thus, security assistance refers to a specific set of U.S. 
loan and grants intended to assist other countries in 
meeting their security requirements and to contribute to 
the U.S. world wide defence posture through a stronger 
collective security framework. 
The different components of the U.S. foreign 
assistance programme are handled by different institutions 
for example, multilateral aid by the State Department, 
bilateral aid and Economic Support Fund (ESF) by USAID, 
Military Assistance Programme (MAP) and Foreign Military 
sales CFMS) by the Department of Defence, etc. The 
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Secretary of state has policy responsibility for security 
assistance, with the budgetary authorization provided by 
the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs 
Committee and appropriations recommended by the Senate and 
House Appropriations Subcommittees on Foreign Operations. 
The major problem posed by the military aid 
programme is the fact that the United States becomes 
embroiled in some bitter, pre existing disputes. America 
provides the aid for the recipient's internal or external 
security, but it is not viewed that way by a neighboring 
state that has a major quarrel with the recipient power. 
The classic case has to do with the long-standing and 
deeply felt animosity between Pakistan and India over 
Kashmir- As an ally of the United States situated close to 
both Soviet Union and China, Pakistan has received a 
substantial amount of military aid. India has always 
viewed this with grave suspicion. 
Security assistance as an instrument of U.S. 
Foreign-Policy is to be traced to the World War II when 
the United States resorted extensively to military supply 
programmes under lend-lease agreement, to support the war 
effort of those countries which could not pay for the 
armaments by way of hard cash or even in terms of deferred 
payments. The most notable transaction was the deal put 
through between Roosewelt and Churchil when 50 American 
destroyers were handed over to Britain in return for 
certain base rights in the British possessions in the 
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western Hemisphere. During the second world war all allies 
of the United States including the Soviet Union were the 
beneficiaries of "lend and lease". 
The post world war II period witnessed an end of 
the cooperation that existed between the United States and 
the (former) Soviet Union at beginning of cold war. A key 
feature of the cold war in the third world was the fierce 
competition between the superpowers for allies. Both 
sides frequently employed military means in their 
competition for influence in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. These military means included arms transfers, the 
dispatch of military advisers, the acquisition of bases 
or "facilities", support for allied military intervention, 
and, on occasion, direct superpower military intervention. 
While nuclear weapons and Europe were arguably more 
important arenas of superpower competition, the Third 
World was the most active arena. Each superpower actively 
sought to maintain its existing allies and to convert the 
other sides allies into its own.^ 
Traditionally, the U.S. Government has viewed arms 
aid and arms sale primarily as an instrument of foreign 
policy to exert regional influence to strengthen 
alliances, and to oppose the expansion of communist 
power.10 The increasing antagonistic relationship between 
the world's new superpowers the USA and the Soviet Union 
(former)- made the American foreign policy grow more and 
more dominated by the fears that Soviet Communism stood 
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poised to sweep over a Europe that had been shattered by 
the war, policy makers in the USA believed that America's 
pre-war isolationism and the failure of Britain and France 
to take an early stand against Hitler had contributed to 
the rise of fascism, and they endeavoured to avoid 
repeating these mistakes in dealing with the Soviet Union, 
a nation that they perceived as being, like Nazi Germany, 
an expansionist totalitarian regime. 
"Collective security", thus became the American 
strategy for defending what came to be called the free 
world. In practice this doctrine took the form of regional 
alliances for mutual defence against soviet expansionism 
and communist supported insurrection. The fear of 
communist threat, therefore, led the United States to 
bolster collective security with military aid and a 
massive infusion of economic assistance. 
Usually observers point to a speech made by 
President Truman on March 12, 1947 as the formal 
dedication of the United States to the prevention of 
communist expansion through military and economic 
assistance to threatened nations around the world. Under 
this policy of containment President Truman asked Congress 
for $400 million in economic and military aid for Greece 
and also Turkey. •'•-^  
in the wake of February 1948 communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia, the American Congress voted for the 
massive infusion of economic assistance into Western 
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Europe under the Marshal Plan. That followed hard on the 
heels of the Greek-Turkish aid package. A year later, 
eleven European nations joined the United States in a 
formal alliance, North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) . It was in the same year that the Congress passed 
the Mutual Defence Assistance Act, which led to the 
creation of programmes that collectively came to be known 
1 2 
as "Security Assistance". 
The Soviet Union's detonation of the Atomic bomb in 
September 1949, the success of the Chinese communists in 
the civil war in October of the same year, the out break 
of the Korean war in June 1950, and the subsequent entry 
of 50,000 Chinese "volunteers" in that war induced 
American policy-makers to expand the scope and range of 
1 3 their economic and military aid programmes. These 
developments convinced the United States of the need to 
build up military strength of like minded countries in 
other parts of the world. This led the formation of the 
CENTO and SEATO. 
These global commitments imposed on the United 
States as the richest, industrially most advanced and 
militarily the strongest power, the responsibility for 
aiding and assisting treaty partners and other friendly 
countries in varying degrees, with military and economic 
assistance. 
Thus the origin of military assistance as now 
understood and practised could be traced to the needs of 
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U.S. foreign policy. American military aid programmes have 
been used in these ways to increase its influence and 
leverage. This perception and understanding of American 
administration has been reaffirmed as in 1981, when the 
secretary of defence Harold Brown in a report to the 
Congress described the significance of military aid as: 
"In the present international and political-security 
environment, security assistance serves the American 
interest by strengthening the ability of our allies and 
friends by assisting other nations in meeting 
their defence needs; we in turn strengthen our own 
security". 
There is no gainsaying that U.S. does have 'vital' 
economic, political and security interests in the various 
parts of the world towards the maintenance of the 
equilibrium of power. By means of giving military aid to 
different countries situated in the various quadrants of 
the globe, which figure in the ambit of American security 
matrix favourably, it ensures its strength through 
influence. 
These foreign policy tools have been used by the 
United States of America since 1954-55. In the wake of the 
Korean war the Mutual Security Act was promulgated. This 
provided the legislative umbrella under which military 
assistance was offered until it was replaced by the 
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1 S Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. "^  
Under the latter a provision for Mutual Assistance 
Programme (MAP) was provided for, through which recipient 
countries were provided grant financing for the purchase 
of defence articles, services and training. •'•^  The MAP 
served till the mid of 1970s as the principal mechanism 
and legislative conduit of transferring weapon from the 
U.S.A. to various parts of the world. All assistance was 
in the form of "grant-in-aid" which required no payment on 
the part of the recipient. 
In the 1950s and early 1960s the MAP programme was 
mainly directed towards Europe. In the mid 1960s to mid 
1970s the greatest percentage of MAP grant support went to 
the East Asian and Pacific region, with major support to 
the Near East and South Asia. After the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan Pakistan had become major 
-1 -] 
recipient at urging of the administration. 
Then there is Foreign Military Sales (FMS) 
financing programme, which provides guaranteed loans and 
direct government credits. As the recipients became more 
prosperous the need for MAP grants declined, and the FMS 
financing programme grew. MAP transfers declined from high 
of $ 5.7 billion in fiscal year 1952 to a level of $ 83.4 
million in fiscal year 1979. Until the Reagan 
administration, FMS transfers largely replaced MAP grants 
at similar levels and were not allowed to grow beyond the 
ability of recipients to repay. ^^ 
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In fact in the fiscal year 1980, the military 
transaction under the FMS accounted for as much as 88 
percent of the $ 17.4 billion military transaction of the 
United States. •'•^  
Since 1981, however, the FMS programme has become 
one of the fastest growing sectors of the federal budget, 
compounding the debt problems of original rationale behind 
the encouragement of sales, the run away growth of the FMS 
programme has generated a renewed reliance on MAP grants 
20 to finance the burgeoning volume of arms orders. 
Then there is of course the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) programme which provisioned 
for the probation and training of the military personnel 
of the recipient countries. A grant programme of $ 42 
million was appropriated by the Congress in FY 1982 for 
this programme. IMET, however, was cut substantially 
beginning in 1972, when 22,000 foreign military students 
trained or studied under the programme; in 1982 the number 
was 3,000.^ -'-
While the piece de resistance of arms transfer; 
whether in a sales, grant or whatever means, is to add to 
the strength of the recipients /allies, and therefore, 
enhance American security nexus. There are certain other 
fringe benefits accruing peripherally to the USA. Much of 
the eguipment which goes out of the USA is of such degree 
of sophistication that the recipient country is not in a 
position to handle it on its own without the supervision 
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and assistance from the supplier country. This provides 
enough justification for sending out technical support 
teams to the recipient nation. These teams or "task force" 
might by the virtue of their indispensability, exercise 
effective control of the combat use to which the weapons 
are put. Thus the United States indirectly exercises a 
measure of control through its "assistance programme". 
Moreover their "technicians" very often alluded to as 
"attaches" who invariably follow a shipment of arms 
provided an indirect means through which the USA exercises 
considerable control over the military and defence policy 
of its client. 
Thus the immediate outcome to the supplier country 
in transferring arms is that it adds to the military 
strength of its friends and on the other hand minimize the 
recipient nation's ^adverse' orientation or hostile 
approach toward the supplier nation. 
Moreover, a substantial number of major arms 
transfer via aid from the USA are accompanied with 
training programme through which the latter endeavours to 
closely integrate members of its defence personnel with 
that of 'key' member of recipient countries. The idea 
behind such programme is to integrate American personnel 
in the administrative echelons of defence department in a 
manner whereby these personnel can exercise influence and 
to an extent as for as possible control the recipient's 
defence and military postures. 
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In any case nations, especially the superpowers 
with global commitment and interests are secretive about 
the details of the quid pro quo involved in any kind of 
aid in the instance if military aid via 'transfer', the 
quid pro quo may involve and entail base facilities, 
staging posts facilities, overflying rights or similar 
strategic military concessions. '^ ^ Infact the United 
States does provide 'official' indication of the 
correlation between arms transfer and its foreign base 
rights-in its financial allocation made under military aid 
programme for 'Basic Rights'. It says that the 
latter shall be provided for ie 
military assistance of all kinds, which will include arms 
transfer also, will be given to all those countries in 
which the United States has access to bases and 
installations essential to optimal deployment of U.S. 
military strength. 
However in a significant move in 1977 the United 
States adopted the Carter administration policy of 
treating conventional arms transfer as an "exceptional" 
foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances 
where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer 
contributes to our national security interest.^4 rp^ e 
Carter administration setforth guidelines specifying both 
monetary and qualitative restrictions. 
As a result the executive branch policy was moved 
in line with the Congressional view that arms sales should 
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be controlled rather than promoted. In practice, however, 
the Carter controls were not as tight as had been 
promised. There were major exceptions made to the 
guidelines and big controversial sales were concluded to 
countries such as Jordan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. 
Nevertheless, the Carter policy did achieve some 
genuine arms restraint during that period. Arms requests 
from over sixty countries were turned down or turned off-
sales valued at over $ 1 billion, including sophisticated 
items such as combat fighter aircraft and Maverick, 
Harpoon and Sidewinder missiles. Infact Congressional 
Research Service found that during the period of restraint 
the value of U.S. arms sales, in nominal terms, remained 
constant and, considering inflation, actually declined . 
The Reagan administration came to office in 1981 
with what it saw as a mandate to sharply change directions 
in many areas including United States approach to arms 
transfer and the related financing of those transactions. 
In sharp contrast to its predecessor, this administration 
had viewed the transfer of arms and service as an 
essential element of the global defence posture ana 
indispensable component of its foreign policy.^^ As a 
result the United States was now engaged around the world 
in efforts to transfer large quantity of highly 
sophisticated military equipment, often financed with 
grants or at very concessional loan rates. 
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e.Changing World and U.S. Military Aid Scenario 
For four decades, the fundamental ordering 
principles of international politics and economics 
remained static. Then the unimaginable happened. In 1989 
and 1990, the 'post-war order' collapsed. With the 
breaking up of the former Soviet Union, end of the Cold 
War, changes in Eastern Europe and the new dynamics in the 
U.S. domestic, political, economic and social scene, a new 
scenario has emerged. As a result, the framework and 
forces which so far have determined the U.S. foreign 
policy in general and its security assistance progamme in 
particular seem to have assumed a shifted dimension. 
The U.S. foreign policy in recent time is passing 
through a vacuum, which was mostly created by the end of 
the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is 
because both these formed the centre-stage of the U.S. 
foreign policy. The absence of any definite foreign policy 
is also due to a fatigue out of the economic recession. On 
the economic front, the U.S. is currently passing through 
a tough time. The economy is one of the longest recessions 
since the Second World War with a 7.5 percent unemployment 
rate, a budget deficit more than $ 300 billion and a GNP 
growth rate of about 2 percent.^^ Under such circumstances 
as a national response to the problems, such slogans as 
'America First' or such ideas as 'isolationism' have 
become guite popular. All these have important implication 
on the country's foreign aid policy and the absence of a 
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well defined overall foreign policy results in a lack of a 
sense of direction of the U.S. foreign aid policy too. 
For the past few years, concerns have been 
expressed with regard to a long over-due need for 
substantial re-examination and redefinition of its major 
goals and purposes as well as with its management. In the 
words of senator Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman of the Senate 
Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee, "there 
must be a substantive bottom-up review of foreign aid such 
as is being attempted for the U.S. defense and 
intelligence policies in the wake of communism's 
demise."^^ It seems that with the end of Cold War, foreign 
aid has lost its sense of purpose. Furthermore, there is a 
growing sentiment in the Congress that foreign aid has 
lost its strategic rationale now that it is no longer 
driven by the Cold War's imperative to counter communism 
at every international outpost. However, there are 
many in the USA who believe that in the changed global 
premise foreign aid has a new role to play and hence it 
should take new forms. "With the superpower thing over", 
says Mc Hugh, "there is a whole new opportunity to develop 
a broader consensus"-^^ And some others feel that it is 
premature to abandon long-standing U.S. security interests 
and challenges. This view is shared by hawkish academics 
and politicians. 29 ^^^^ envision that there can be 
revival of older threats and there may be new threat. 
which may jeopardize the ^order' that U.S. would like to 
)e 
:s 
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maintain. 
Even though there were much talks on overhauling 
the foreign aid programme both within the Congress and 
the Executive, little progress has been made. In a broader 
sense, the US foreign aid policy still contains many of 
the same elements that used to characterized it during the 
Cold War years. Its major outlays are still driven by 
security concerns. Military aid accounts for nearly one 
third of the total $ 1.6 billion go to countries providing 
the US with foreign military bases, and Israel and Egypt 
continue to be the major recipients of the US aid. There 
are, however, some new elements too. With the changing 
global situation, there would be more stress on economic 
aid rather than military to Eastern European countries and 
the republics of the former Soviet Union to develop their 
democratic institutions and to make transition to open 
market economics. They would,however, need bread not 
weapons. 
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U.S.-PAKISTAN ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP 
The second World War resulted, among other things, 
in an accentuation of nationalism in Asia and Africa and 
the emergence of India and Pakistan as two sovereign 
independent states. The United States of America, now 
being easily the greatest world power, started involving 
itself not only in the affairs of Europe and Latin America 
but also in all significant developments all over the 
world. The era of American "isolationism" was at an end. 
The United States was playing a new role as the leader of 
the advanced industrialised countries of the West. The 
supremacy of the United States was not, however, 
universally accepted. It was challenged by the socialist 
countries led by the Soviet Union. Confrontation between 
the USA and Soviet Union resulted in the emergence of Cold 
War era, and containment of communism became the chief 
objective of the U.S. foreign policy. 
The United States having checked the advance of 
communism in Europe through the Marshal Plan and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), was now turning its 
attention towards Asia. But the task was not so easy as 
the Soviet Union was -also striving to expand its sphere of 
influence, or at least to deny the United States the 
friendship of as many countries in Asia as it could. 
During and after the second World War the thinking 
in the US Government circle was that China should be 
united and made a democratic country to serve as a 
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counterweight to Japan and the Soviet Union in the 
Pacific. China did become united, but it did not become a 
friendly China. Infact the collapse of the Chiang regime 
and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 
October 1949 were a shattering blow to the diplomatic and 
military policy of the United States in East Asia. The 
^loss' of China forcefully brought to the consciousness of 
American policy-makers the importance of strengthening 
relations with the two countries of the Indian 
Subcontinent the only states whose combined population and 
resources could nearly match those of China . 
The United States of America was, thus, desperately 
in need of friends to stem the advancing tide of communism 
in Asia^. In the early years of independence The United 
States undoubtedly tended to attach more importance to 
India than to Pakistan primarily because of its larger 
size, its industrial potential, and the general impression 
about India . But India's non-aligned posture was quite 
disappointing to the American leaders. The last hope of 
the US was belied when Prime Minister Nehru, during his 
visit to the US in October 1949, made it clear, both in 
his public speeches and in his private talks, that India 
would definitely not. align itself with one bloc against 
the other and remain non-aligned, following an independent 
foreign policy"*. Disappointed with the Indian 
attitude to its policy of forming a ring around communist 
countries by means of bilateral alliance and regional 
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pacts, America moved towards Pakistan, the only 
alternative. Moreover, the strategic location of Pakistan 
on the door steps of the Soviet Union and the Peoples 
Republic of China was considered important. For U.S. 
Military strategists Pakistan represented a centrally 
positioned landing and launching site for aircraft and 
missile aimed at either Russia or China^. The proximity 
of North-West Pakistan and "Azad Kashmir" (under Pakistan 
control) to Soviet Central Asia, and that of East Pakistan 
(now Bangladesh) to Tibet and Sino-Burma border had been 
important strategic reason for American interest in having 
a military tie with Pakistan. Apart from strategic 
importance, many Americans thought that it could be also 
used as a link between South East Asia and Middle Eastern 
defence system^ as the eastern wing of Pakistan formed the 
Western boundary of South East Asia. 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was formed 
in 1949 in the Western sector as a part of anti-communist 
regional defence system of the United States world 
strategy . In the eastern sector the US signed defence 
treaties with Japan, Thailand, Taiwan, the Philippines and 
South Korea. But the southern sector, comprising the 
Middle East and the South Asian countries which were 
strategically important from the American viewpoint, was 
still undefended. Between Western Turkey and Eastern 
Thailand there was a wide gap which had to be filled so 
that^ the policy of 'the containment of communism might 
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succeed. Americans saw that the leading Arab States were 
busy with their preoccupation with Israel, and therefore, 
were not inclined to listen to the Western reasoning of 
bringing these countries into its alliance system in 
defence of the "free world". They also knew that India 
was ^positively' neutral. In such circumstances importance 
of Pakistan certainly increased in the US strategic 
calculations. 
a.USA and Peikistan: Divergence of Interests 
Pakistan's thinking was quite different from that 
of the USA. It did not feel any threat either ideological 
or territorial from any of communist powers. Whatsoever 
apprehensions Pakistani leadership had from Chinese and 
Soviet quarters, it was clear that they were not so much 
because of their being communist countries as they seemed 
to be, but because of their close relations with immediate 
neighbours India and Afghanistan with whom Pakistan had 
long standing disputes. 
The perceived threat of India, however has been the 
main factor in Pakistan's relations with the United 
States. India has been the principal preoccupation of 
Pakistan's defence and foreign policies. Its overall 
weakness^ and strategic vulnerability vis-a-vis India, the 
continuance of several disputes in which it accused India 
of having changed the rules of the game according to its 
9 
convenience , and lingering memories of partition riots 
and communal hysteria, have combined to present India as 
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the most important threat to its existence and security. 
This has often loomed large over the political horizon of 
Pakistan-'-^ and impelled it to seek allies and military 
aid.11 
Among the varied reasons for the Pakistan 
Government seeking US military aid, the decisively and 
most important was to strengthen itself militarily against 
India. Both official spokesmen and unofficial sources have 
committed enough indiscretions (calculated and otherwise) 
publically and privately, in support of these reasons. 
Foreign (especially American) observers and journalist 
have also testified to this.-^' 
Pakistan hoped that its alliance relationship with 
the United States would bring several benefits: (a) a 
guarantee against Indian aggression (b) military aid to 
establish parity with India, and^ ^^  (c) pressure on India 
to resolve the Kashmir dispute^^. It was this Pakistani 
outlook and posture which led Pakistan to appear pro-west 
and anti-communist, to give up its erstwhile policy of 
non-alignment^ , seek and accept U.S. military aid, and 
eventually to join the SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (CENTO). 
This was done on the one hand to strengthen itself 
militarily against India, and on the other to ensure 
western support to its stand on Kashmir. When the 
Pakistani Government found that the sympathy and support 
of the Western powers (in particular of the USA and UK) 
would not go as far as backing publicly and fully the 
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Pakistani stand on the Kashmir dispute (as the Soviet 
Union did in favour of India at the end of 1955) , 
Pakistani leaders not only complained against and 
denounced the West but even threatened to walkover to the 
17 
communist camp. . 
It is evident that Pakistan was less moved by 
ideological interests which were in any case subsidiary 
to its Indo-Centric goals. Pakistan's Foreign Policy 
makers took advantage of the many opportunities inherent 
in the Cold War environment by using the right rhetoric in 
the right place and at the right time. 
One aspect of Pakistan's rhetorical tactic was to 
emphasize the strategic value of Pakistan and the danger 
of the Russian drive toward the Indian Ocean. Another was 
to assert that Pakistan was the most dependable friend, 
the staunchest ally of the United States in Asia. 
Moreover, Pakistan's policy-makers often stated that 
future of Pakistan-US relations was very bright because, 
as one of Pakistan's finance minister commented, "we have 
the same way of looking at things and we are the two 
peoples who talk the same language"-'"®, that same language 
was the language of communist threat. 
This rhetorical tactic had an impact; American 
officials heard and appreciated them. For instance, 
Phillip Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, made the 
following comments during a Congressional Hearing: 
"Pakistani statesman have spoken strongly in defence of 
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the free-world, both privately and in various world 
forums"^^ American officials were defending military aid 
to Pakistan on the basis of Pakistan's supposed anti-
coitmvunist stand. For example, in discussing military aid 
to Pakistan, David Bell AID administrator, stated that 
despite flirtation with China, Pakistan was strongly anti-
communist and Pakistan's military forces should be 
2 0 
improved through additional aid. 
Thus the United States and Pakistan were moving in 
the same direction for different reasons; the United 
States was guided by its global policy of containing 
international communism; and Pakistan was motivated by 
problem of national security and defence. 
b.Korean War and Peace Treaty with Japan: Pakistan's 
Outspoken Support anu India's Strong Opposition 
Pakistan's outspoken support to the USA on its 
stand on Korean War and signing of peace treaty with Japan 
was a significant factor in promoting friendly relations 
between Washington and Karachi. The outbreak of Korean War 
in July 1950 and the development that followed sharply 
intensified the interest of American leaders in the 
reactions of the two states of the subcontinent.The 
involvement of the United States and the profound 
emotional impact of the conflict on American opinion 
provided an opportunity that was skilfully used by 
Pakistan to build an image of itself as a "trust worthy" 
friend in South Asia^l. However in i-v,^  K 
nuwever, in the beginning 
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American did not pay much attention to the attitude of 
Pakistan; they were, infact, busy in applauding India 
because of its acceptance that the aggression had been 
committed by North Korea*^ . 
American enthusiasm for India, however, diminished 
when India abstained from the vote on the "Uniting for 
Peace" resolution and, even more, when Nehru urged a 
cease-fire and negotiations in Korea as well as seating of 
representatives of the Peoples Republic of China in the 
United Nations,The proposal, however, reportedly aroused 
considerable misgivings among American policy makers and 
was turned down by Secretary of State Dean Acheson^-^. 
As Nehru continued his occasional pronouncements on 
ending the war and on admitting China into the United 
Nations, and as India led fight against the American 
sponsored move to brand China an aggressor, there was 
growing irritation in the United States over India's 
course^'^. India's attitude and the reaction that evoked 
in the United States during this period had significant 
conseguences in shaping the course of subsequent relations 
between America and Pakistan. The United States needed the 
support of important Asian countries and now considered 
Pakistan's usefulness as a potential ally. 
In contrast to the Indian attitude, the American 
policies in Korea were vigorously supported by the 
Pakistani Government without any reservation. Karachi was 
not slow to judge how much a movement of American public 
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opinion could be turned to its own advantage. At the 
outbreak of war Liaqat Ali Khan was still in the United 
States recovering from an operation. He lost no time in 
declaring in a public statement that his government will 
back the United Nations to the fullest, in any action it 
may take in the Korean War^^. Karachi also expressly 
supported the USA on "Uniting for Peace Resolution" in the 
General Assembly in November 1950 
On August 29, 1950, Pakistan informed the Security 
Council that it could not spare any ground troops to help 
fight the War in Korea because of grave danger that 
confronted it^^. It shrewdly sought to spread the 
impression in the United States that unlike India it was 
ready to send troops to fight alongside the UN soldiers in 
Korea, but that only its difficulties with India stood in 
the way^^. Expressing regret at Pakistan's inability to 
send troops to Korea, Liaqat Ali Khan asserted that, even 
though unable to render that form of help to the UN war 
effort in Korea, Pakistan was making an equally important 
contribution to the wider aim of preserving peace, 
Pakistani troops were fulfilling that function at home, he 
added^^. 
Another important development which caused 
disenchantment between the USA and India and brought the 
former closer to Pakistan was the signing of a peace 
treaty and a military pact between the United States and 
Japan. With the emergence of a potentially strong 
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communist China and the outbreak of the Korean War, the 
United States felt impelled to take urgent steps to 
convert Japan into an ally against communist inroad in the 
Far East-^^. Since the days of Japanese surrender, the 
American policy in the Far East had been to keep Japan in 
a state of perpetual impotency, both military and 
industrial, but hereafter US sought to rehabilitate the 
Japanese industrial and military power and make use of 
that power to contain communist China. America convened in 
San-Francisco a conference of 51 nations to discuss how 
the status of war between Japan and Allied Powers could be 
brought to an end. While Pakistan accepted the invitation, 
India refused to participate. 
Pakistan not only signed the Japan-Peace Treaty but 
also voiced powerful support for it from the floor of the 
conference. Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan claimed it 
was "a good treaty" offering justice and reconciliation. 
He held the American proposal as an "evidence of a new 
departure in the relations of the East and West" and a 
"harbinger of even happier consummations"-^-^. 
Contrary to Pakistani view, Nehru held that 
defensive alliances openly aiming some other country or 
countries defeat their own purpose of trying to maintain 
peace through strength^^^ The authorities in New Delhi 
interpreted this treaty as an extension of "power 
politics" and expressed grave apprehensions that it would 
lead to an era of new tension in Asia. They considered 
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these measures of Washington as acts of provocation 
against communist China which in addition brought the Cold 
War into the Indian subcontinent thereby threatening 
India's security. The outright opposition of India to 
the treaty and- Pakistan's uneguivocal support at a 
critical juncture and enthusiastic approbation for it, 
certainly left a deep impression on the mind of Americans. 
Thus added to the divergent attitude of India and Pakistan 
towards the Korean War, their diametrically opposed role 
in the diplomacy relating to the Japanese Peace Treaty 
further accelerated the process of US estrangement from 
India and friendship towards Pakistan . 
c.Steps Towards Military Alliance 
Pakistan moved for US help in its search for 
security, after being disappointed by Britain and the 
Muslim countries of the Middle East. Pakistan wanted to 
gain support from these countries but they refused to do 
so. The Commonwealth refused to take side with Pakistan 
because the question between India and Pakistan had 
involved two of its member . The Middle East countries, 
which had just achieved their independence after prolonged 
struggles under the banner of Arab Nationalism, did not 
like the concept of Pan-Islamism of Pakistan. They had 
several internal problems of their own to cope with. They 
were, therefore, not in a position to bear 
responsibilities abroad and give material help to Pakistan 
in case of an outbreak of hostilities between India and 
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Pakistan or between Pakistan and any other country. 
Pakistan's attempts to secure friends among the 
Islamic states to take its side against India did not 
achieve much success, because they attached greater value 
to friendly relations with India which was bigger and took 
more active interest in their anti-colonial struggle. 
Another reason which can explain the failure of Pakistan's 
plan was its inability to give stout support to Egypt and 
Iran in their disputes with Britain concerning military 
bases at Suez and the nationalization of oil, because of 
its need for Britain's economic and political support. 
Thus, Pakistan felt isolated and friendless-^ ^ , 
decided to enter into military alliances with the US in 
its desire to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India on the 
question of Kashmir for bargaining from a position of 
strength. The United States with its enormous military 
economic resources and political influence was seen as the 
only Big Power with whom an alliance would enable Pakistan 
to meet its defence and economic requirements as well as 
boost up its international status. 
It was realization of its isolation and the 
inadequacy of its own resources to guarantee its security 
in the context of its relations with India; the economic 
crisis which had created a serious distress among the 
people, which impelled Pakistan to seek the support of the 
USA. It was nothing to do with Soviet Union or threat of 
communism. One Pakistani writer accepting this fact, had 
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remarked that in Pakistan the danger of conquest by a 
communist power was very remote compared with the 
immediate and continuing danger of forcible merger with 
India . Pakistan alignment, thus, was not based on 
genuine anti-communism. The occasional flurry of anti-
communist statements and the pledge to defend freedom, 
democracy and individual liberty were more a nature of lip 
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services to their allies"^ . 
On the otherhand, US strategists also saw Pakistan 
as a valuable asset in their global search for allies and 
bases around the U.S.S.R.^^^. In their view the communist 
success in China had already increased the threat of 
communist expansion in Asia. The events in Egypt, Iran and 
Jordan in 1951 and 1952, and the disturbing situation in 
South East Asia created by Indo-China War, called for a 
readjustment and reinforcement of the Western position in 
Asia. India had refused to line up with the United States 
anti-communist front, and remained unshaken in its non-
aligned attitude. Pakistan appeared as an alternative, 
commendable more for its wilingness to join military pacts 
and its strategic advantages than for its resources or 
stability. 
d.Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement: Beginning of US 
Military Aid 
Against this backdrop it was only natural that 
Pakistan and United States should proceed to forge a 
military tie up. Pakistan took the first step to secure US 
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military assistance in September-October 1953 during a 
visit by General Ayub Khan to Washington D.C. He held 
discussions, among others, with General Mathew Bunker 
Ridgway, the US Army Chief of Staff, Admiral Arthur 
Redford, and John Foster Dulles. Eversince Pakistan 
started its search for arms and dependable supporters. 
The next major step was taken during Governor 
General Ghulam Mohammad's November visit to Washington 
accompanied by Foreign Minister Zafrullah Khan, he met 
President Eisenhower as well as Secretary Dulles.Later a 
State Department official announced that there had been 
continuous consideration of Middle East defence and he 
linked those discussions with the recent visit of Ayub 
Khan. The spokesman also said that both leaders talked 
about Pakistan's possible role in Middle East Defence, as 
with the virtual abandonment of the MEDO the part that 
Pakistan might play had to be re-examined. The State 
Department's own record also indicate that Pakistan made 
some informal and unofficial requests for military aid 
from the USA, during the autumn of 1953, and the incumbent 
Administration, considering Pakistan as part of northern 
tier, began to discuss the idea of providing some military 
aid to Pakistan as an aspect of the defence of the Middle 
East. 
Americans no doubt had long been agreed that their 
global strategy against communism demanded a military 
stronger Pakistan, but they still hesitated to take the 
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final plunge for fear of offending India. A State 
Department official admitted that informal discussions had 
been going on for the last year or two,-^^ but President 
Eisenhower said at a press conference that the US would be 
most cautious about doing anything that would cause 
hysteria in India . 
The last hurdle was crossed after Vice-President 
Nixon, at the behest of the President, had visited 
Pakistan and India, among other Asian countries. During 
his three day stay in Karachi, in the first part of 
December 1953, Nixon told the Pakistanis that he was 
convinced that the people of Pakistan had a firm 
determination to thwart communist ambitions, and that the 
USA would be proud to support Pakistan in industrial 
development and also in defence. 
On his return he reportedly influenced President 
Eisenhowever infavour of an alliance with Pakistan that 
would act as a counttSrforce to the confirmed "neutralism" 
of Nehru's India^ . He recommended military aid to 
Pakistan and thought the United States decision on this 
subject must be guided by what was best for America and 
should not be deflected by any fear of Indian reaction. 
Nixon's effective two hours presentation at the National 
Security Council clinched argument and it was finally 
decided to offer military assistance to Pakistan"*^. 
On February 22, 1954, when all preliminaries had 
been completed, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammed 
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All Bogra, announced at a press conference in Karachi that 
his country had formally requested the United States for 
military assistance within the scope of the Mutual 
Security Act, "for the purpose of achieving increased 
defensive strength and a higher and stronger degree of 
economic stability designed to foster international peace 
and security within the framework of the United Nations 
Charter."^'* Three days later President Eisenhowever 
announced in Washington that the United States had decided 
to respond favourably to Pakistan's request'*^. Meanwhile 
in an effort to satisfy the Indian Government, Eisenhower 
assured India that "this step does not in any way affect 
the friendship we feel for India". He also said that "if 
our aid to Pakistan is misused.... I will undertake action 
to thwart such aggression". He also made similar offer of 
military aid to India^^. 
In a statement before the Lok Sabha on March 1, 
1954., however, Nehru vehmently criticized the US decision 
to supply arms to Pakistan. Commenting on Eisenhower 
assurance to him and.his offer of similar military aid to 
India, he said "if we object to military aid being given 
to Pakistan, we could be hypocrites and unprincipled 
opportunists to accept such aid ourselves""*^. 
On May 19, 1954 after months of intense 
negotiation, Pakistan and the United States signed an 
agreement on US aid, called the Mutual Defence Assistance 
Agreement, in Karachi. The agreement which consisted of 
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seven articles, came into force with immediate effect. It 
obliged United States to supply to Pakistan only "such 
equipments, materials, services or other assistances as 
the Government of the US may authorize in accordance with 
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such conditions and terms as may be agreed . It was 
stipulated that Pakistan should not undertake any act of 
aggression against any other nation and that it should use 
American military aid exclusively for internal security 
and its legitimate self defence or to participate in the 
defence of area or in UN collective security arrangements 
and measures. Pakistan also agreed not to transfer 
American arms received under the agreement to any other 
country without the prior consent of the United States. In 
short the agreement bound Pakistan to the regional and 
global diplomatic and security objectives of the United 
States'^^. 
Pakistan welcomed the military relationship with 
the United States in so far as it offered a way of 
strengthening its military capability and its bargaining 
position vis-a-vis India^°. The United States on its part 
found in the military alliances an opportunity to maintain 
its military (and political) presence on the territory of 
its allies. 
e.Pakistan Enters into SEATO and CENTO 
The Mutual Defence Agreement of 1954 was the basis 
on which Pakistan received military equipment from the 
United States. In the belief that membership in American 
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sponsored multinational arrangements would bring forth an 
expanded programme of arms supplies and more vigorous US 
support for its own diplomatic and military objectives, 
Pakistan became a member of South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO-
Central Tready Organization in 1955). 
SEATO 
The ceasefire in Korea in 1953 July enabled the 
Chinese to concentrate on Southeast Asia and consequently 
China increased the scale of its assistance to North 
Vietnam, making the French position in Indo-China 
progressively worse. With a view to checking the perceived 
Chinese expansion, the Americans decided to extend the 
containment policy to Southeast Asia. The Americans 
thought that if any of the local state, battling 
communists, were allowed to fall then not only would the 
emerging communist regime in the area be eventually all 
linked ideologically, militarily, and politically with the 
USSR and Red China and deny the entire area to the USA, 
but there would also be a chain reaction throughout the 
area. In responding to this perceived threat the Americans 
not only extended active support but also encouraged the 
area states to form a regional security alliance that 
would include the USA. 
Thus a conference at Manila resulted in the South 
East Asia Collective Defence Treaty^^ of September 8, 
1954, creating an alliance consisting of Pakistan, 
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Thailand, the Philipines the USA, the UK, France, 
Australia and New Zealand, and a proclamation of general 
principles entitled the Pacific Charter^^. Following 
India's lead Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia had declined to 
come to Manila. Pakistan, on the other, after some 
hesitation, had accepted the invitation and was 
represented at the meeting by Foreign Minister Zafrullah 
Khan. 
Most interesting thing with SEATO was that almost 
all members of this pact joined it to attain their own 
objectives. Perhaps it would be true to say that SEATO had 
as many objectives as it had members. Admittedly, the 
American objective was to foster collective efforts in the 
region to check the perceived expansion of communism but 
the objective of the other members of SEATO were all 
different. Pakistan's decision to join SEATO appears to 
have been more influenced by a desire to please the 
Americans than a conviction of its utility to cater for 
Pakistan's security needs. 
Pakistan, however, was not too much happy with the 
SEATO because Pakistan was knowing well that it would 
receive no protection from SEATO against an Indian attack, 
which was its most immediate concern. Nowhere in the 
entire document is there to be found even indirectly a 
hint of a suggestion that the treaty should address itself 
to Pakistan's proclaimed concern-Hindu expansionism, 
Indian imperialism,- building Pakistan military for a 
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possible showdown with India, helping Pakistan to recover 
Indian occupied Kashmir, or even defending Pakistan in 
case of unprovoked Indian attack. Moreover, the United 
States wrote a reservation into the treaty that its 
obligation under Article IV(1) would extend only to cases 
of communist aggression. At the conference, the Pakistani 
Foreign Minister insisted that the proposed treaty should 
guarantee against aggression from any country communist or 
non-communist alike. Zafrullah Khan argued valiantly that 
"all aggression is evil" but he was unable to prevent the 
US from entering the rider. Three factors seem to 
have influenced the decision makers to opt for membership 
of SEATO. First, the desire to please the Americans after 
the successful conclusion of the military aid agreement. 
Second, one of the purpose of signatories was to win more 
friends, and Pakistan was certainly looking for friends in 
order to atleast strengthen its case on Kashmir. Third, 
the development in East Pakistan which necessitated not 
only extra US aid but also strengthened fears regarding 
communist activities. A combination of the above mentioned 
factors could have influenced Pakistani decision makers to 
opt for membership in SEATO. That would atleast please the 
USA, help procure much needed arms, and to gain a kind of 
psychological defence against India. 
The Baghdad Pact (CENTO) 
Middle East has always been an area of great 
concern for USA due to presence of huge oil resources and 
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its strategic location attracted more. After the Second 
World War both super-powers fully realised the strategic 
significance of oil for its own sake and as a means of 
denying vital oil supplies to the adversary. General 
Eisenhower, even commented that there was no area 
strategically more important than the Gulf. 
In order to protect interest of its own and its 
friends and ally, the USA, after the withdrawal of the UK, 
decided to establish -military alliances with the countries 
of the region. First step in this direction was taken when 
it signed Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with Irag on 
April 21, 1954. Subsequently Turkey and Iraq signed a 
pact of Mutual Cooperation at Baghdad on February 24, 
1955, for the purpose of collective defence arrangements 
for the Middle East. The same was later joined by the 
Britain on April 5, 1955, Pakistan on June 30,1955 and 
Iran on November 3,1955 which popularly came to be known 
as Baghdad Pact. After the July 1958 revolution, however, 
Iraq ceased to participate in pact activities; hence in 
October the headquarters was shifted to Ankara; in March 
1959 Iraq formally relinquished its membership and in 
August the name of the organization was changed to the 
Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). 
The Baghdad Pact provided ' that "the high 
contracting parties will co-operate for their security and 
defence, but that such measures as they agreed to take may 
form the subject of special agreements with each other 
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(Art-1) . Also, that this pact shall be open for accession 
to any member state of the Arab League or any other state 
actively concerned with the securities and peace in this 
region and which is fully recognized by both the high 
contracting parties-'^. 
Although the USA had canvassed for Baghdad Pact and 
later fully participated in its work, but never officially 
signed the treaty. Ambassador Waldernar J. Gallman, United 
States observer at the council meeting in November 1955, 
gave two reasons why the USA thought that it could 
contribute more by remaining out of the pact: (1) It was 
perceived that formal US adherence to the Pact was likely 
to further estrange Egypt and other Arabs, and (ii) it was 
thought that US participation might invoke an Israeli 
counter-demand for a Mutual Defence Treaty especially in 
view of the fact that the Baghdad Pact came into existence 
through the efforts of an Arab country-Iraq, and it could 
become an issue in the next presidential election. And a 
treaty with Israel would cause the Arabs, including Iraq, 
to reject alliances with the US and make them receptive to 
Soviet overtures.^^ 
Pakistan, on the otherhand, joined the Pact with 
relatively more enthusiasm than SEATO. Four considerations 
seemed to have influenced the Pakistani decision-makers to 
opt for formal membership of the Pact. First, Pakistan has 
always stood for special ties with Muslim-countries. Right 
from its inception, it had tried hard to forge stronger 
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bonds with most Muslim countries in the Middle East. 
Pakistan regarded itself as an integral part of the Middle 
East and consequently it always demonstrated a keen 
interest in participating in all the schemes relating to 
the defence of the area. Second, at the time of joining 
the Pact, Pakistan genuinely perceived a communist threat 
to the countries of the Middle East. Third, having secured 
the most desired military assistance treaty with the USA, 
the Pakistani's had been demonstrating overtly to 
undertake such ventures that would please the Americans, 
Fourth Pakistan realised that its participation would 
further erode existing insecurity and would atleast, 
strengthen the psychological security against India. 
By becoming member of Baghdad Pact, Pakistan became 
truly America's "most allied ally in Asia" and only Asian 
country to be a member of SEATO and CENTO. Pakistan, 
however, never disguised the motivating compulsions that 
pushed it to join SEATO and the Baghdad Pact, and what is 
more interesting is that Americans were also fully aware 
of these when they decided to encourage Pakistan's 
participation. As far as Pakistan was concerned the reason 
had little to do with the avowed objective of the Pact 
which was to contain "international communism" in the 
area.As usual, Pakistan's foreign minister Firoz Khan 
Noon,asserted that "enmity of a powerful neighbouring 
country had obliged Pakistan to enter into defence 
alliances to preserve, its freedom, and that "Pakistan 
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will not agree to commit suicide by getting out of the 
Baghdad Pact which is its defence against India". A 
Pakistani writer, acknowledging this fact wrote that 
"although these pacts were ostensibly directed against 
communism, Pakistan's entry into these was largely 
motivated by her consuming desire to neutralize, if 
possible to counterpose, the growing Indian military 
strength . 
The reason, thus why Pakistan joined the 
military alliances was very different from the reason why 
the United States created the alliances. Why then the 
alliances if the aims and objective of the two parties 
were so doubly divergent? Infact, the United States 
recognized Pakistan's preoccupation with India, but felt 
that it would be able to keep the Indo-Pakistani rivalry 
under control, and that, in any case, it would not allow 
that rivalry to interfere with its own global anti-
communist strategy. In its anxiety to create the various 
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alliances it overlooked Pakistan's special motives 
It was against this background that the United 
States took steps to extend military assistance to 
Pakistan. 
f.A Resume of U.S. Military Aid to Pakistan before 1980 
Pakistan's bilateral treaty with the United States 
and former's membership of SEATO and CENTO made it 
eligible to receive massive military and economic 
assistance from Wash-ington. It is, however, a difficult 
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task to get accurate and specific information on the US 
military aid provided to Pakistan, because of two reasons. 
First, the information regarding defence and military is 
always put in secrecy, and second, there is difference in 
statistics in statements made by the political leaders and 
actual deliveries. According to a document of 
National Security Council (USA) the total value of US 
military aid programmed for Pakistan during the period 
1950-1958 was $411.6 million. Items valued at $276.4 
million had been delivered during the period, leaving an 
undelivered balance as of 30 June 1958 of items worth 
$135.2 million^^. 
As it has been pointed out that during the period 
1950-30 June 1958 the total grant military assistance 
programmed for Pakistan was $377 million. Then how much 
assistance did Pakistan receive from that date to the 
outbreak of hostilities between Pakistan and India in 
1965, when the United States imposed an embargo on arms 
deliveries to both countries? According to consolidated 
statistics published in december 1979 by the Comptroller 
of the Security Assistance Agency, Department of Defence, 
total deliveries/expenditures on the military assistance 
programmed for Pakistan (excluding "training") amounted to 
$650.28 million during the period 1950-1969^^. Assuming 
that all the deliveries had been made by the time the 
embargo was enforced in 1965, and deducting the figure of 
$377 million acknowledged to have been expended during 
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1950-30 June 1958, we get $273.28 million as the outer 
limit of grant military assistance that Pakistan could 
have received from the United States during the period 1 
July 1958-Sept. 1965. 
At the 1973 US Congress hearings it was reported 
that Pakistan had received $630 million in grant military 
assistance, $619 million for defence support assistance, 
and some $55 million worth of equipment on cash or 
concessional basis between 1954 and 1965. 
The substantial amount of modern planes and 
equipment supplied to Pak-by US consisted of B57 Jet 
Bombers, F-86 Saber Jets, F104 Supersonic star fighters, 
Sidewinder missiles, transport planes, helicopters and 
supporting equipment and supplies. They also supplied a 
Super Radar for F104s, an acceleration in the delivery of 
previously programmed M-47 tanks, and two new items, 
antitank missiles and C-130 Turbo-Jets, Cargo Planes, F-
104s were delivered to Pakistan after General Ayub Khan's 
return from his tour of Washington in 1961. 
The USA also maintained a Military Assistance 
Advisory Group of about 100 personnel in Pakistan. The 
entire aid was furnished under aide-memoirs signed in 
1954, 1960, 1961 and 1962, in which the USA agreed to 
equip four specific units of Pakistani armed forces. 
The increase of US economic aid to Pakistan was 
also not without military implications. It seemed to have 
been subsidy to the main percentage of the huge war 
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machinery which Pakistan had tried to set up during 1954-
1964. American economic aid to Pakistan until the end of 
fiscal year 1965, was estimated worth $2.5 to 3 billion. 
Pakistan's share of US aid upto 1954, was only 0.2 
percent of the total economic aid supplied to various 
countries. This slender percentage increased to 2.9 
percent in 1958 and 7.9 percent in 1964. This aid was to 
the tune of 5 percent of Pakistan's GNP in 1959-60 and 6.3 
percent in 1960-65. 
US-Pakistan relations, ofcourse, received a serious 
set back when the former announced an embargo on the 
supply of military equipment to both India and Pakistan, 
in the wake of 1965 Indo-Pak war. The US embargo affected 
Pakistan more than India because of two reasons. Firstly, 
Soviet Union had not imposed any restrictions on arms 
supply to India, and secondly, since Pakistan was almost 
dependent upon the US for military hardware, spare parts 
and other ammunition. But one thing is important to note 
that inspite of embargo, America continued supplying 
military hardwares to Pakistan through other countries 
like, Iran, Turkey, West Germany and Italy^'^, 
The embargo, however, did not continue for long. It 
was partially lifted "within six months to permit the sale 
of non-lethal items on cash or credit basis subject to a 
case-by-case review, consisting of spare parts for 
previously supplied US equipment^^ On October 12, 1967, 
US aid policy was further modified to resume the sale of 
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non-lethal arms to both Pakistan and India.^^ 
When US imposed embargo on arms supply to Pakistan 
during 1965 Indo-Pak War, Pakistan became conscious of 
inherent dangers of a heavy reliance on one source of 
supply of weapons. With the traditional source of supply 
cut off, Pakistan looked for new source of arms 
procurement, which included China, France, Soviet Union 
(1968-69) and European Markets. Pakistan also obtained 
military hardware through Turkey and Iran. 
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In 1969, Pakistan's clamour for more armaments" 
got a favourable response from new US President Richard M. 
Nixon^^, who was known as a firm supporter of military aid 
and alliance with Pakistan. Efforts were soon made by 
Nixon Administration to lift the ban on lethal weapons, 
that had been imposed in 1965^^. Presumably Nixon had 
plans of improving relations with China and he wanted to 
use Pakistan as go-between. In 1970 Pakistan was given 
military hardware worth $15.40 million from the US at a 
throwaway price, as the market value of these arms was 
estimated to be $150 million, probably to save of 
opposition in the Senate^°. 
Bangladesh crisis was another test of U.S.-Pakistan 
alliance relationship. Although an embargo was imposed in 
1971 by the USA but in March 1973, it returned to the 1967 
policy- However, USA "worsened the situation by sending its 
task force of the 7th fleet into the Bay of Bengal. After 
considerable deliberation, the State Department announced 
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on February 24, 1975, the "ending" of the 1971 embargo on 
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weapons transfer to Pakistan. -^  
The United States supplied military equipment worth 
$30 million in 1974^^. After the War of 1971, Pakistan 
raised two more divisions upto 1975, including an 
independent armoured brigade. Again more than half of 
Pakistan's combat squardons were equipped with US air-
crafts. 
In the War of 1971 Pakistan had lost a large part 
of its military equipment worth of $200 million. With its 
military demoralised and India proving its ascendance once 
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again, Bhutto needed American military assistance. 
Since then Pakistan had been striving hard to acquire arms 
from the USA and other sources. It has not only recovered 
the material which it lost in the War but has enlarged and 
strengthened its mililtary forces to a record level. With 
the lifting of the embargo, Pakistan was free to get US 
lethal weapons short of nuclear ones. In 1975, just after 
lifting the embargo the US Defence Department approved 
sale of llOA-7 light bombers and it contracted with 
Pakistan worth $700 million for military aid. . 
In 1977, the United States Congress passed the 
Symington-Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act, 
which forbade US military and economic assistance to any 
country receiving "nuclear enriched equipment" which was 
not subject to Atomic Energy safeguards. Pakistan fell 
into this forbidden category with the result that all US 
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assistance was terminated in April 1979. There was, 
however, a revival of US interest in security cooperation 
with Pakistan in the wake of downfall of the Shah regime 
in Iran and the entry of Soviet troops into Afghanistan in 
the same year. 
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U.S. MILITARY AID TO PAKISTAN 1980-91 
a.Afghan Crisis and US Renewed Interest in Pakistan 
The Afghanistan crisis of 1979 became a turning 
point for US-Pak alliance relationship. The past 
deterioration in their relationship on account of 
Pakistan's nuclear programme came in for reappraisal. The 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan towards the end of 
December 1979 brought about a dramatic change in the 
situation and led the American policy makers "rediscover" 
the strategic importance of Pakistan. The Carter 
Administration emphasized Pakistan's new role as a "front 
line state" against possible Soviet expansion. American 
scholar Thomas Perry Thornton wrote that Pakistan now 
became "an essential line of defence and an indispensable 
element of any strategy that sought to punish the Soviets 
for their action" . In its efforts to re-establish close 
military and security ties with the threatened Pakistani 
government, the Carter Administration even overrode its 
nuclear concerns, which had inhibited it so much in the 
past. 
The American response towards the Afghan 
intervention in general and towards Pakistan in particular 
has to be viewed in the wider context of other 
developments in the region. The fall of shah in Iran, a 
strong and closest American ally in West Asia and Persian 
Gulf, and coming into power of a revolutionary regime 
under Ayatollah Khomeini which was extremely critical of 
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the USA and whose calls for Islamic revolution alarmed the 
conservative Sunni monarchs of the Gulf, inaugurated the 
crisis. America's political and strategic interests in the 
Gulf suffered a further setback when the U.S. Embassy 
personnel were taken hostage in Tehran by supporters of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in November 1979. The spiralling events 
were coupled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The 
Soviet action raised the spectre of renewed Soviet 
exapnsionist strategy in the Middle East and had signalled 
a change in the strategic balance in the region . 
All these developments in the region of South West 
Asia and Persian Gulf was a matter of considerable concern 
to Washington, as its interests and stakes were in peril. 
The area was considered to be "vital" to America's 
interest because 33 percent of oil imported by the United 
States came from there. Corresponding figures for Western 
Europe and Japan were 66 percent and 75 percent 
respectively-^. 
The United States State Department considered 
Soviet actions to have increased "the potential threat to 
the security of nations in the region and to the World's 
access to vital resources and shipping routes". To most 
Americans the Soviet action in Afghanistan was nothing 
less than an "invasion". They viewed it as part of a 
Soviet master plan to undermine and overwhelm the West by 
increasing control over the oil-rich Persian-Gulf. Richard 
Nixon, former American President, remarked that the 
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incident marked the assertion of the Soviet Union's global 
power which posed a challenge to America's status as a 
Super-Power. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, defended its 
intervention in Afghanistan as a counter move to a U.S. 
military build-up in the Gulf region that commenced after 
the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. Brezhnev termed the 
Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) "as an instrument of the 
policy of military interference". Soviet analyst Alexi 
Petrov linked the American concern about Afghanistan to 
the fall of Shah of Iran and remarked that with the 
downfall of Shah regime, "cracks appeared in the notorious 
strategic arc that the Americans have been building for 
decades close to the southern border of the Soviet Union 
and in order to mend the crack they have sought to bring 
under control the Afghan people. 
The main framework of U.S. Perception of Soviet 
action in Afghanistan was that it was a "deliberate effort 
by a powerful atheist government to subjugate an 
independent Islamic people and threatened both Iran and 
Pakistan and was a stepping stone to possible control over 
much of the World's oil supplies"^. America's main 
allegation was that a major intention behind the Soviet 
move in Afghanistan was to bring the oil fields of the 
Gulf region under Moscow's influence and control and 
thereby threaten the West. President Carter before the 
Joint session of the Congress on January 23, 1980, stated 
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that "the region which is now threatened by Soviet troops 
in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. The 
Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet 
forces to within 300 miles of Indian Ocean and close to 
the Straits of Hormuz-a waterway through which most of the 
World's oil flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to 
consolidate a strategic position. Therefore, that poses a 
grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil. 
Thus to contain Soviet expansionism Carter crafted 
a strategic doctrine, which was dubbed as "Carter 
Doctrine". The core of the doctrine was a 50 word 
declaration:"An attempt by any outside force to gain 
control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an 
assault on the vital interest of the United States of 
America and it will be repelled by use of any means 
necessary, including military force". 
Carter stood his doctrine primarily on America's 
own military power. The five specific parts of the 
doctrine's architecture amply justified this°. These were, 
first, the Rapid Deployment Froce, to improve America's 
capability to deploy U.S. military force rapidly to 
distant areas, second, enhanced naval presence in the 
Indian Ocean and acquisition of base facilities in the 
Gulf and Northeast Africa; third, it was recommended that 
the Congress should approve a strong defence budget for 
1981 encompassing a 5 percent real growth in authorisation 
without any reduction; fourth, the creation of security 
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framework in the region with the countries with different 
value and political.beliefs under the US auspices; and 
fifth, defence commitments to Pakistan in order to assist 
it in resisting any outside aggression and, accordingly, a 
reaffirmation of the USA's 1959 executive agreement with 
Pakistan^. By using the label "A Framework of Regional 
Cooperation" for his doctrine, Carter seemed to imply that 
USA did not intend to wage a global Cold War with the 
Soviet Union, rather its intention was to contain Moscow 
in the Persian Gulf region. In essence, therefore, the 
Carter Doctrine conferred doctrinal justification on the 
USA to intervene in the Arabia-Persian Gulf-South West 
Asian region to protect the interest of the West. 
Any understanding of Pakistan's response to the 
Afghan crisis must begin with an analysis of its 
underlying security predicament. Francis Fukuyama feels 
that since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan Moscow 
has had three principal objectives with regard to 
Pakistan: first, to control and, if possible, eliminate 
threat to its own position in Afghanistan arising from 
Pakistani territory, second, to block the emerging 
relationship between Pakistan and the United States, and 
to prevent the former's possible inclusion in a larger 
Western security system for the Persian Gulf; and third, 
over the larger term, to gain direct air and naval access 
to. the Arabian Sea through the Balkanization of 
Pakistan^°. 
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As a result of Soviet advance, Pakistan which shared 2,4 00 
K.M. long frontier with Afghanistan felt itself directly 
exposed to Soviet military pressures because Afghanistan 
ceased to be a buffer between Pakistan and Soviet Union. 
Islamabad had now faced a number of security threats, 
which included the threat of possible Afghan and Soviet 
support for separatist elements among the Baluchi and 
Pathan populations of Pakistan, and the influx of a 
swelling flood of Afghan refugees into Pakistan"^-^. The 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had generated fears and 
apprehensions among many Pakistani's that Moscow, having 
consolidated its position in Afghanistan, would try to 
extend its influence beyond the Afghan borders by using 
Afghanistan as a spring board to distabilize Pakistan in 
order to fulfil its historic desire of access to a warm 
water port on the Indian Ocean. According to a Pakistani 
analyst, given the situation in his country since December 
1979, Islamabad faces a three-front threat scenario, viz. 
an Indian threat, the threat from Afghanistan and an 
internal threat. 
On account of this threat perception it was, 
therefore, natural for Pakistani leaders to endeavour to 
improve relations with the United States-their erstwhile 
ally and benefactor, which was also planning to assist 
Pakistan in order to check the Soviet move. Thus 
convergence of interest once again brought the USA and 
Pakistan more closer.. Pakistani criticism of the induction 
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of Soviet troops in Afghanistan became more strident, 
especially in view of the strong American reaction to the 
Soviet intervention. This was apparently an effort to 
emphasize the threat it faced from the Soviet presence in 
Afghanistan and gain the sympathy of the United States and 
other Western countries for its cause. 
The American desire to assist Pakistan is evident 
from a statement made by National Security adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. He said that the sale of U.S. arms to 
Pakistan would be undertaken to make "credible" to the 
Soviet Union that the USA stood by its commitments to its 
20-year old defence arrangement to come to the aid of 
Pakistan with armed forces, if necessary . This was 
sustained by President Carter's T.V. interview in the 
third week of January, 1980, that the "USA will use force 
if necessary to protect Pakistan against Soviet attack". 
Later in his State of the Union message on January 23, 
1980, Carter urged the Congress to reconfirm the 1959 
executive agreement with Pakistan. On January 31 that year 
the Carter Administration informed key congressional 
leaders that it intended to enter into a longterm military 
support relationship with Pakistan. ^'^  Congressional 
sources said that originally the US Administration had 
thought of seeking only an emergency "one time exemption" 
from the law^^ barring Pakistan from American aid because 
of its nuclear weapons programme, but ultimately the 
Administration planned to seek repeal of the ban on aid to 
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Pakistan without any time limit. 
The Carter Administration also took some new policy 
initiative as an open protest against Soviet "adventurism" 
in Afghanistan. It decided to provide every possible 
assistance to Afghan rebels against the Soviet controlled 
Government. It sought to extend its military links with 
China to bolster Pakistan's security. The US response to 
Pakistan's security needs was linked with its "new 
doctrine" of containing the Soviet Union in the Gulf and 
Central Asia. With a view to explaining its political and 
strategic presence in the region, the US government had 
addressed its policies to "ward off Soviet design on the 
Persian Gulf"-'-^ . Its new arms policy was an attempt to 
reassure its allies that America would not leave the 
Soviet invasion go unchallenged. 
Pakistani leaders, however, had some reservations 
about the reliability of American support because it had 
let down its ally twice in the past in 1965 and again in 
1971 and concern regarding the hypocrisy of the non-
proliferation policy of the United States. It was also 
feared that Carter Administration would not be very 
forthcoming in extending strong political and military 
support to Pakistan in view of its keen desire to maintain 
its friendly relations with India. 
On January 12, 1980 Foreign Affirs Adviser and 
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance held discussions in 
Washington on "the implications for international peace 
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and security of recent developments in Afghanistan and on 
how the US might be helpful in assisting Pakistan under 
the present circumstances" •'•^. And after a great deal of 
consultation within the State Department between the 
Secretary's office, the NEA and ACDA and between State and 
White House the immediate military response to "the 
gravest crisis confronting the West since World War II" 
was unveiled-"-^ . It was comprised of a two year package of 
$100 million of Economic Support Fund (ESF) and a similar 
amount of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) aid credits for FY-
1980 as well as FY1981^^. This was said to be a part of 
the larger consortium effort Washington was endeavouring 
to workout to assist Pakistan. 
The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency which had worked 
with Congress on the April 1979 ban based on the 
Symington-Glenn amendment, began contacting Capitol Hill 
on proposed aid to Pakistan. NEA obtained promises that 
the Congress would be sympathetic to the Pakistani aid 
package. The expectation was that the nuclear 
proliferation issue will be shoved aside by the more 
urgent issue of regional stability^^. Having secured 
appropriate assurance from the Congress, the Carter 
Administration also moved to ease other issue that had 
played US-Pakistan relations by removing US objections to 
Pakistani pleas for debt rescheduling, and reviewing 
earlier refusal to supply fighter aircraft. 
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Pakistan was an important factor in fashioning US 
policy on Afghanistan. As its neighbour and as a country 
with whom the United States had a bilateral agreement that 
had stipulated a U.S. response (even though the wording 
of the agreement was cleverly adroit in lacking 
specifics), it could use its nonalingned status to plead 
the case at the United Nations and also invoke its 
Islamic and Third World credentials to canvass for a 
condemnation, and the resulting isolation of the Soviets, 
were important to Carter. Thus it was important for him to 
bring Pakistan back into the fold and convince it to 
actively cooperate with the United States. This was the 
reason why so much energy was expended on Pakistan and why 
Pakistan's inability to forget the previous record of the 
Carter Administration was so gravely resented bythe White 
House. 
To assuage Pakistan's doubt about the seriousness 
of U.S. intentions, munitions lists began to be 
formulated. The list of weapons drawn up included the 
Redeye man-portable infrared guided missile, the improved 
Hawk anti-aircraft missile, and the TOW wire-guided 
antitank missile . The list was to be presented to the 
Pakistani government in Islamabad in early February, in 
order to demonstrate U.S. resolve in meeting the Soviet 
challenge. At the same time, Washington wished also to 
indicate that the United States was cognizant of Indian 
Sensitivities: "We seek good relations with both. Our 
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assistance to either is not directed at the other"^^. 
Much to Washington surprise, President Zia-Ul-Haq, 
however, dismissed American aid offer of $400 million of 
which only $200 million was for military aid, on Jaunary 
17, 1980 and ridiculed it by saying it as mere "peanuts". 
He felt that the aid package was "terribly disappointing" 
and that it could not buy security for Pakistan^^, He 
added that it was too small to be effective but large 
enough to buy greater animosity from the Soviet Union 
which is more influential in the region than the United 
States^'^. The obvious reasons for his rejection were, 
first, that Pakistan found the level of aid pledged by the 
USA insufficient and, second, the USA was still resisting 
Pakistan pressure for formalising the 1959 security 
agreement into a treaty^^. President Zia, infact, thought 
that the leaders of the United States were in a state of 
panic after the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan and that was an opportune time for him to 
extract the maximum commitment from them. 
Contrary to Pakistani view, the White House felt 
that it was "both substantial and responsive to Pakistan's 
needs". Pakistan was urged to accept "the reality that 
the United States alone can not meet all of Pakistan's 
requirements."26 ^he offer of $400 million, Thornton 
feels, was perhaps not munificent, but was surely not 
"peanuts" as Zia described it. Furthermore, it was always 
intended as part of a larger package that would draw on 
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contributions from other donors and be supplemented by 
larger American efforts in later fiscal eyars^^. 
Carter tried to allay Zia's fear by reaffirming the 
1959 Agreement of Cooperation with Pakistan in his speech 
before the Congress. It was symbolism but it was 
nonetheless important because Pakistan had raised question 
of a Congressional understanding. The reasoning behind 
such a move was the realization that Pakistan had suffered 
from the personalized nature of its relationship with 
Washington and that Congressional commitment would provide 
the much needed continuity. Zia wanted a formal treaty, 
ratified by the Congress. The State Department, however, 
felt it to be totally an inappropriate request on Zia's 
part. An impasse was rapidly reached whereby Zia, noting 
that the invasion of Afghanistan had "brought the Soviet 
Union to our doorstep"^^, stated that in the absence of 
"active participation" by the United States, Pakistan may 
have to adapt itself to the new reality: If you live in 
the sea, you have to learn to swim with the Whales" became 
a part of his lexicon. Citing the fact that: "history has 
tought us not to harbor any illusions"^^ regarding U.S. 
participation, Zia looked toward China and Islamic nations 
for support. However, while the Chinese assured Pakistani 
leaders that Sino-Pakistani cooperation occured outside 
the Sino-American framework, they advised cooperation with 
the United States. 
In an effort to reach a compromise on the issue 
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with Pakistan and to discuss the quantum of aid and nature 
of the American commitment, the National Security Adviser 
Zbingniew Brzezinski and deputy Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher paid a visit to Islamabad in February 1980. 
In a statement Zia-ul Haq welcomed the fact that "the 
traditional ally", viz, the United States, was giving an 
30 
impression of finding the lost Asian ally-^  ". 
Brzezinski spoke eloquently of the commitment of 
the United States to the identity, integrity, and 
independence of this "vital region" and its determination 
to help Pakistan to meet the threat at its door.-^ -"- During 
the discussion, however, problem arose on the nature of 
the US commitment as the US team sought to assure their 
Pakistani counterparts of Washington's seriousness. But 
Pakistan was adamant on this point and feeling had 
persisted in Islamabad that the "quality of the commitment 
outweighed specific quantities of aid". A few planes or 
100 tanks were not the issue. What was crucial, however, 
was whether the United States would give its word to 
defend Pakistan and keep it. The model cited was that of 
China's: "They did not give that much aid, but their word 
is as good as gold with us". President Zia held the view 
that the "Americans wanted to give a little aid, let 
Pakistan burn its bridges forever to the Soviet Union, and 
then leave it in the lurch," 
Brzez,inski's^fcs^^|,^^s^not quite successful, though 
each side gaine^^^^S^-ir under^^a^ing of the other's point 
• -c 
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of view. Recalling his visit to Pakistan he wrote in his 
memoirs: "on the question of US assistance to Pakistan 
little progress was made. The Pakistanis repeated their 
request for much more substantial assistance and they 
coupled it with the request that the US Assurance to 
Pakistan be interpreted to include a possible Indian 
attack as well. We made it plain that this would not be 
the case and that our commitment included the Soviet Union 
only".^2 
A military delegation headed by Assistant Secretary 
of Defence David Mc Giffert, whose task was to make the 
list of Pakistani Weapons requirements, travelled to 
Pakistan as the visit of the Brzezinski team was drawing 
to a close. This team, however, also did not make much 
progress due to persistent differences of opinion between 
the two sides about the nature of threats faced by 
Pakistan because of the presence of the Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan and consequently as to what type of military 
equipment would be suitable to meet these eventualities. 
There were a number of lists drawn up consisting of what 
the United States was prepared to give and what the 
Pakistanis felt they minimally needed. The discrepancy 
between the two set was enormous. When the Pakistanis 
finally produced their own list, it was what one US 
official called "wishful shopping list" costing in the 
region of $11 billion. Included in it were radar, 
aircraft, antitank missiles, armed helicopters, tanks 
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lightfield artillery and self propelled guns"-^ -^ . 
Thus impasses continued till the last date of 
Carter Presidency. While Pakistan rejected the aid offer, 
stunned and peeved, Carter would not revise it, and it was 
left to his successor to come up with a more acceptable 
offer, 
b.Reagan and U.S. Aid Package 
The process of forging a close security 
relationship with Pakistan was given a distinct momentum 
by the Republican Administration under President Ronald 
Reagan. Unlike Carter, Reagan was determined to challenge 
the Soviets anywhere in the world and Afghanistan emerged 
as a major trump card in the containment of Soviet power 
and influence. To the Reagan team, countries in strategic 
locations needed to be supported with military and 
economic aid to deter any aggression against them by the 
Soviets. Thus in its overriding belligerent attitude 
toward the Soviet Union, Reagan and his team rejected 
Carter's arms restraints, non-proliferation, and human 
rights policies. Consistent with this new permissive 
policy framework, Pakistan emerged as a strategically 
important state. 
With Ronald Reagan coming to power. General Zia's 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the USA improved. He 
cleverly seized the opportunity of playing on Reagan's 
strong anti-communism to obtain a satisfactory level of 
military aid for Pakistan. Reagan was evidently trying to 
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replace the loss of Iran by converting Pakistan into an 
outpost of the USA's line of frontification on the Persian 
Gulf region. The result was a manifold increase in the 
U.S. arms and economic aid to Pakistan in the 1980s and a 
substantial bolstering of its defence capabilities, 
despite the concerns expressed by some quarters on the 
trampling of democracy and human rights by the Zia regime 
and Pakistan's quest for achieving nuclear capability. 
The Reagan Administration began to lay the ground 
work which would facilitate the eventual extension of 
substantial military.and economic assistance to Pakistan. 
Secretary of State Alexander Haig urged the Congress to 
soften the ban on aid for countries which were keen to 
acquire nuclear technology in the larger interests of 
helping a strategically located country which was subject 
to Soviet pressure.-^'* To that end, the US Administration 
proposed to the Congress on March 19, 1981 that Pakistan 
should be exempted from the Symington Amendment, which 
prohibited US assistance to countries which pursued 
nuclear enrichment technology and refused to give 
assurance that they were not developing nuclear weapons. 
Jane A. Coon argued that the imposition of a ban on aid by 
the United states had not truly accomplished the anti-
proliferation objective of US policy. The sanctions had 
only led to "a growing sense of isolation and insecurity 
in Pakistan".^^ 
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations voted on 
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May 14, 1981 by 10 votes to 7 to lift restrictions on aid 
to Pakistan and approved the Administration request for 
$100 million in Economic Support Fund (ESF) for FY-1982, 
and $600,000 for the International Military Training and 
Education Programme (IMET) for Pakistan. 
Several rounds of discussions stretching over six 
months were held between Pakistani and American officials 
before Pakistan formally accepted the US economic and 
military aid package on September 15, 1981. Previously the 
United States offered a five year $2.5 billion package to 
Pakistan, which was later raised to $3.2 billion beginning 
with FY-1983.-^^ The . new package included interalia, an 
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additional $500 million worth of commodity assistance. 
The package of $3.2 billion was divided euqally 
between economic assistance and foreign military sales 
credit guarantees of $1.6 billion each. Of the $1.6 
billion economic aid component of the package, $1 billion 
was in the form of a grant. The remaining $600 million had 
a 10-year grace period and 20-year repayment period at 2 
and 3 percent interest respectively. The military sales 
component of $1.6 billion carried an interest rate of 14 
percent with a repayment period of 30 years with a 7-10 
years grace period on the principal.-^^ 
The Reagan Administration package was designed in 
large measure to meet Pakistan's air defence needs as a 
large proportion of the total military credits (some $1.1 
billion) was to go for the acquisition of 40-F-16 fighter 
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aircrafts. The Pakistanis were quite insistent on 
procuring the F-16 over other available models such as the 
F5E and others, both as an earnest of renewed American 
political commitments and because they felt it best suited 
to their air defence "requirements over the long haul. The 
United States agreed to deliver the first batch of six F-
16's from European production lines by December 1982, 
while the remaining 34 were to be delivered begining in 
April 1984. 
In addition to the F-16's, Pakistani ground and 
naval forces were also to be modernized. Among the items 
promised by the United States were 100 M48A5 tanks, 35 
M88AI recovery vehicles, 20 M901, 1-TOW vehicles (together 
with 1,005 1-TWO missiles), 64 M109 A2 self-propelled 
howitzers, 75 M198 towed howitzers, and 10 AH-IS attack 
helicopters. Other items which were under discussion 
included further tanks and attack helicopters, A-lO close 
support aircract, APC's surface to air missiles, anti air 
craft artillery, and new naval ordnance.-^^ 
From the point of view of the Pentagon this 
agreement with Pakistan was a logical and necessary 
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While 
urging the Congress to approve the five year economic and 
military aid package. President Reagan wrote to the 
Congress in February 1982 that failure to respond to 
Pakistan's clear need for external assistance at this 
critical time would "Jeopardise important American 
security interest"'^^ 
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Pakistan's continued request for F-16s aircraft yielded on 
December 4, 1981 when it finally signed a "letter offer 
agrement" with the United States in respect of the sale of 
the first batch of six high performance F-16 Jets to this 
country. Speaking after signing the agreement on behalf of 
the Government of Pakistan Lt. Gen. Ejaz Azim said "The 
friendship that was dormant has been revived". He added 
that "in 12 month time we will see the F-16's flying in 
the skies of Pakistan. They will defend not only the 
borders of Pakistan but also the frontiers of the free 
world". American representative Mr Leslie Brown had 
remarked that "this infact, marks a new plateau in the old 
friendship. "^•'- The first batch of F-16 super sophisticated 
aircraft from USA finally reached Pakistan's Sargodha base 
on October 13, 1982. 
Despite the financial constraint, Pakistan received 
massive military aid from USA during the FY-1984. In a 
fervent appeal to the Congress to keep the aid commitment 
to Pakistan at the agreed levels and not to make any cut, 
the State Department officials said that the relations 
between the USA and Pakistan had been volatile and that 
"it is crucial, as we move to re-establish our ties, that 
we do all, we can build trust and confidence in each 
other's reliability. We need to allay any lingering 
Pakistani doubts about the depth of our commitment to the 
revived relationship". He revealed that Pakistan had 
already made financial commitment totaling $550 million in 
84 
1983 alone to be paid to American arms contractor for 
weapons purchase, and that any cuts in the aid would put 
them in difficulty. 
The Reagan Administration proposed to give 
Pakistan $745 million of which $225 million in economic 
assistance and remaining $520 million in military 
assistance for the FY-1984. In addition it was also 
proposed to give $57.4 million by way of PL-480 
assistance. Besides a budgetary provision of $800,000 had 
been made to train Pakistani Military Officers in USA.'*^ 
It was reported in December 1984 that Pakistan had 
asked the Reagan Administration to be allowed to acquire 
the E-2C airborne early warning system, otherwise known as 
Hawkeye, to guide its long range F-16 attack bomber. By 
the middle of November 1984 total 25 F-16 aircraft had 
been delivered to Pakistan. Previously the USA was 
evidently impressed with President Zia-ul Haq's plea for 
more sophisticated weapons system and was examining the 
request sympathetically. However in 1985 the Reagan 
Administration turned down this Pakistani request on the 
basis of a recommendation made by a specific Pentagon 
team,, which visited Islamabad to assess the suitability 
of this aircraft for Pakistan. The team was of the view 
that the Hawkeye-E2C aircraft for early warning border 
surveillance was not suitable for Pakistan'^-^. 
The Reagan Administration several times provided 
substantive aid to Pakistan in addition to ongoing aid 
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package. President Reagan in October 1985 had asked the 
Congress to approve a $103 million aid package to Pakistan 
which was supplementary to the ongoing $3.02 billion aid 
package and $50 million A1M92 Side Vinder missile sale.'^ '^  
The United States on March 24, 1986 finally agreed 
to provide Pakistan with a $4.02 billion military and 
economic aid package for 1987-93, a 35 percent increase 
over the existing package but far short of Pakistan's 
request of $6.5 billion'*^. The agreement marked the 
culmination of year long intense negotiations between the 
two sides both in USA and Pakistan. The two sides 
announced that the package would be at highly concessional 
terms and USA would continue to play an important role in 
Pakistan's defence modernization efforts. The ongoing $3.2 
billion military and economic aid package (1981-87) 
expired in 1987. 
To acknowledge the American assistance, Pakistani 
Prime Minister M.K. Junejo paid a visit to USA in July 
1986. During his stay the American President reaffirmed 
the US "commitment to Pakistsn's independence, security 
and territorial integrity". The two leaders expressed 
satisfaction over the successfull conclusion of 
negotiations earlier 1986 of a followon assistance 
package for Pakistan of $4.02 billion over a six year 
period beginning in 1987. President Reagan stressed that 
this unique multi-year programme provided tangible 
evidence of the durability and continuity of US commitment 
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to strengthen Pakistan's defence capability in the face of 
Soviet pressure from Afghanistan. He expressed his 
admiration for Pakistan's courage in standing up to Soviet 
pressures through Afghanistan and for its selfless 
provision of humanitarian relief to the nearly three 
million Afghans who had fled to Pakistan in the last seven 
46 years.^" 
The US defence Secretary, Mr. Caspar Weinberger 
visited Islamabad in October 1986. He repeated his 
country's determination in strengthening Pakistan's 
defence capability to meet any border threat under the new 
six year package. During his stay Pakistan repeated its 
request of getting airborn early warning system. President 
Zia was of the view that "this system would definitely 
multiply the military value of the F-16s"^'. 
The Reagan Administration on January 6, 1987 
proposed $678 million in economic aid and military sale 
package for the FY-1988 which was an increase of $12 
million over its aid for FY-1987. During the FY-1986 the 
US Administration proposed $666 million aid to Pakistan 
but the Congress approved only $638 million, as in the 
House of Representatives and Senate Committee, opposiition 
Democrats were in control. In the figure presented for the 
FY-1988, Pakistan was to receive $290.92 million in 
military assistance, the bulk of it was in the form of 
military sales credits, and $386.95 million in economic 
aid. However, it was not made clear that how the military 
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funds would be spent, but an airborn early warning system, 
sophisticated tanks and additional F-16 fighters were 
4 ft 
under consideration. 
According to a National Security Council Report 
published in May 1987 "continued support for Pakistan" was 
of great importance to the USA. It was said that a well 
armed Pakistan would be counterbalance to Soviet 
expansionism in the "region. It is through Pakistan that 
USA can fight Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and assist 
4 9 Afghan rebels fighting against such forces. 
The US-Pak alliance relationship suffered a setback 
in August 1987 when on July 10 the U.S. authorities 
arrested a Pakistani born Canadian citizen Arshad Parvez 
in Philadelphia on charge that he tried to export to 
Pakistan a special steel alloy that could be used in the 
enrichment of weapons-grade uranium, Pakistani officials, 
however, denied any links to the suspect in that case. 
Earlier in June 1984 another Pakistani Mr. Nazir Ahmad was 
arrested in Houston while trying to smuggle Krytones 
electronic switches that can trigger nuclear bombs, to 
Pakistan. 
The United States of America expressed its serious 
concern over nuclear issue and said that Pakistan needed 
to take concrete steps to restore its credibility and 
further assurance that it was not trying to develop a 
nuclear weapon. In the mean time (in 1985) American 
Congress had passed a law (Pressler Amendment) that 
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prohibited US aid to a nation that possess nuclear 
weapons. Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Sub 
Committee on Asia, Stephen J, Solarz said that Pakistan 
appeared to have exhibited "a blatant disregard for 
American Law. If we do not enforce the laws it will make 
mockery of our non-proliferation policy". Mr Solarz urged 
President Reagan to act to halt the aid to Pakistan. 
The US concern over Pakistan's nuclear programme took a 
serious turn when in a surprise move it stalled all its 
aid to Pakistan till January 15, 1988 in the wake of 
latter's attempts to smuggle out nuclear weapons oriented 
materials and its refusal to allow the inspection of its 
Kahuta nuclear plant. The two aid programmes which had 
been put off were the $540 million military and economic 
aid and the renewed $4.02 billion aid which was to 
commence from October 1st. This was the first concrete 
action aginst Pakistan since 1979. 
However, on December 4, 1987 in a complete reversal 
of its previous action the US Congress cleared the $4.02 
billion military and economic aid package for Pakistan. 
Both the House of Representatives and Senate approved the 
resumption of the aid to Pakistan over the next six years 
stalled for 3 1/2 months since October 1987, when Pakistan 
was charged with violating U.S. regulations regarding non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
With the clearance of $4.02 billion US military and 
economic aid package for the next six years, Pakistan 
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proceeded with its plan to buy 100 more F-16 aircrafts. 
Arrangements for the purchase of the F-16 were discussed 
between the Government of Pakistan and the US 
Administration during the visit of the U.S.Assistant 
Secretary of Defence Mr. Richard Armitage to Islamabad in 
January 1988. What was significant in this deal was that 
the new rates quoted for each F-16 at $10.5 million were 
much lower than the $25 million a piece Pakistan paid for 
the 40 F-16S purchased under the first military economic 
aid package of $3.20 billion which concluded in September 
1987. Of the 40 F-16S that were to be supplied to Pakistan 
during the first aid package period, so far 35 F-16 
aircraft were reported to have arrived. 
The US Congress approved $445 million military and 
economic aid to Pakistan for the FY-1989. A greater share 
of the aid-$230 million was allocated for military 
supplies, while the balance of $215 million was in 
economic assistance. In the FY-1988 Pakistan was given 
$480 million of which $260 million was in military 
supplies. The reduction in the aid for 1989 was the result 
of US budgetary constraints, which had affected all the 
recipients. -^^ 
The death of President Zia-ul Hag in August 1988 
and the subsequent election of Benazir Bhutto as Prime 
Minister, evoked greater U.S. interest in Pakistan. Newly 
elected Republican President George Bush also showed keen 
interest in cooperating with democratic Pakistan. The 
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military, after a dozen years of martial law, allowed the 
election to take place and Bhutto to take power as a 
civilian leader. But it was clear that military would stay 
out of politics only as long as it continues to receive a 
larger chunk of Pakistan's national budget-means US aid 
and high tech US equipment like F-16 fighters and MI 
tanks. It was beleived in Washington that, suspending aid 
to Islamabad might even prompt a military take over in the 
name of national security. 
Keeping in mind all this fact, the United States 
proposed a large amount of $626.7 million military 
economic aid to Pakistan for the FY-1990. This included 
$50 million of development assistance, $80 million of PL-
480, $20 million of Economic Suport Fund (ESF) , $240 
million of Foreign Military Sales grant, a one milion 
dollar IMET programme, as well as $5.7 million in 
narcotic. Testifying before the House Foreign Affairs Sub 
Committee on Asia and Pacific, Mr Haward Schaffer, the US 
Deputy Secretary for the Near East and South Asia, said 
that: "Even after the withdrawal of Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan remains vital to achieving our goals 
of a non-aligned, independent, and stable Afghanistan and 
to our broad goals in South and South West Asia. For these 
reasons we must continue to honour our commitment to 
support Pakistan's security and economic needs".^^ 
C.Pakistan's Nuclear Programme and Suspension of U.S. Aid 
- Oct. 1990 
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The nuclear issue had placed an unusual strain on 
relations between the United States and Pakistan, after 
years of growing ties following the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan. Pakistan's nuclear programme has been an 
issue of contention throughout the period, however, 
because of the US law linking aid to non-proliferation. In 
the past Pakistani officials had given assurance that they 
are not developing an atomic weapon, and the Reagan 
Administration had consistently waived the aid 
restriction. However, once again, in a surprise move the 
US Administration on October 1, 1990 decided to suspend 
all military and economic aid to Pakistan, worth between 
$564 million and $578 million in 1991, following renewed 
fears that Pakistan had developed a nuclear weapon. The 
decision was the result of the failure on the part of 
President Bush to certify that Pakistan's nuclear 
programme was being designed exclusively for peaceful 
purposes. 
Under the 1985 Pressler Amendment to the Foreign 
Assistance Act, it was made clear that "no assistance 
shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment 
or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, 
unless the President shall have certified in writing to 
the Speaker of the House of the Representatives and the 
Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the 
senate, during the fiscal year in which assistance is to 
be furnished or military equipment or technology is to be 
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sold or transferred, that Pakistan does not possesses a 
nuclear explosive device"^^ On October 9, 1990 the US 
Secretary of State, James Baker informed Pakistan's 
Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan that future aid 
would be impossible unless convincing new evidence was 
55 provided that no "nuclear explosive device" existed. 
Undoubtedly the US has stringent laws to bar aid to 
countries suspected to be engaged in a nuclear weapons 
programme, but they have always been subordinated to its 
strategic interests. The US Administration had been 
knowing since the autumn of 1986 that Pakistan is 
producing weapons grade uranium at Kahuta. Washington Post 
reported that Pakistan had detonated a high explosive 
device between September 18 and 21, 1986^^. Moreover, Mr. 
Reagan in 1988 and Mr. Bush in 1989 personally declared 
that evidence about Islamabad's continuing pursuit of 
weapons was making it difficult to give the certificate 
that the President is required to provide annually that 
Pakistan "does not possess a nuclear explosive device". 
During 1989 voices were being raised in the Congress, 
notably by Mr. Stephen Solarz and Mr. John Glenn, that 
Pakistan must make fresh promises of good behaviour to 
qualify for a certificate. Washington Post^"^ had meanwhile 
editorially called for a termination of aid "clearly and 
without regret". But there were many who had been 
lobbying Congress for continuance of aid under a temporary 
waiver to give time to the regime that took office in 
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Islamabad after the October 24 election, to respond to 
U.S. concern. 
The certificate was given in 1988 on November 18, 
two days after the conclusion of Pakistan's general 
election of that year. Possibly by doing so. President 
Bush wanted to claim to be champion of Pakistani 
democracy, that he was using the leverage of the 
certificate for good purpose. Infact the US Administration 
in past has used several excuses to getover the US Laws 
which specifically prohibit aid to countries which possess 
or are trying to acquire nuclear weapons. Till the 
presence of Soviet forces in Afghanistan it was argued 
successfully that to continue aid to Pakistan was 
necessary to buy its support for Afghan rebels. But that 
excuse no longer existed with the Soviet withdrawal. And 
when Benazir Bhutto was elected as Prime Minister, US 
officials made another excuse that it is necessary to 
continue the aid to support democracy in Pakistan. The 
sale of F-16S at Ms. Benazir Bhutto's request was said to 
be as much for helping her to consolidate a democratic 
order as for meeting the country's "legitimate" security 
needs. 
Ms. Benazir Bhutto after becoming the Prime 
Minister assured the Congress and the White House that "we 
do not posses nor do we intend to make a nuclear device". 
But in subsequent months the CIA had gathered sufficient 
evidence indicating that Pakistan was still working on the 
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bomb. There had been reports that Pakistan had been 
modifying its (US) supplied F-16 Jets so that they could 
carry nuclear weapons. In September 1990 some fresh 
evidence of Pakistan's suspected procurement efforts came 
to light. It was reported that in early 1990 Pakistan made 
several clandestine efforts to buy high-temperature 
furnaces from Consarc Corp. of New Jersey. The furnaces 
were capable of producing metals for nuclear weapons 
system. Consequently US military and other aid to 
Pakistan was suspended since October 1990. Thus for 
more than a decade, the US officials found reasons to look 
the otherway while Pakistan moved steadily closer to 
becoming a nuclear power. That was particularly true 
during the War in Afghanistan, when Pakistan served as a 
key staging area for supplying anti-Soviet guerillas with 
American made weapons. But now that the Cold War 
apparently is over, Washington is no longer quite willing 
to turn a blind eye. Washington may now feel that it no 
longer needs to worry so much about staying on good 
relations with Pakistan. The ending of Cold War, infact, 
has made it more difficult for Third World countries to 
play Moscow and Washington against each other. And 
moreover, the Gulf Crisis 1991 has taught Washington the 
danger of looking the otherway while countries such as 
Iraq develop chemical-warfare programmes or nuclear 
capabilities. 
Although nuclear diplomacy appeared to have induced 
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a change in the American perception of the policy towards 
Pakistan. The development in Central Asia seemed to have 
made the U.S. Policy makers rethink Pakistan's strategic 
role. A peculiar convergence of interests is taking place 
once again. But the nuclear issue will perhaps still be an 
important determinant in the future course of US-Pak 
relations. 
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INDIA'S SECURITY 
a.Concept of National Security 
National Security has long been the fundamental 
concern of every state in its individual and corporate 
existence. Its use as a core concept in our National and 
International affairs became wide spread only after the 
World War II.-*- The concept of security lies at the root of 
most nation-state behaviour. Security, at an elementary 
level, implies anything that gives or assures safety, 
tranquillity, certainty, freedom from fear, risk, danger, 
or doubt.^ It also stands for protection or defence 
against attack, sabotage, subversion, interference, 
espionage etc. 
National Security is much the same as 
personal security. According to Atlantic Charter, 
security for a nation, as for the individual, embodies not 
only "freedom from fear", but also the desire of a nation 
to go about its business and life in whatever way it 
choose to pursue its own interests by its own methods . 
It refers to the situation that now and in the future the 
functioning of the nation should not be thwarted but on 
the contrary be assured so that the nation can exist in a 
fundamentally unimpaired fashion. It also reflects a 
feeling that gives confidence that disaster of war and 
vagaries of national and international life could be 
avoided or absorbed. 
Robert Mc Namara is of the view that not 
100 
only national confidence but also the freedom to develop 
and improve the future position is implied by security. To 
him security is the development of economic, social and 
political life of a nation which may not relate to 
yesterday but to tomorrow. 
Security in the modern world has been 
considered as the creation and sustenance of the 
conditions which safeguard the nation's sovereignty and 
territorial integrity without exposing the nation to any 
threat of annihilation. Frank N. Trager and F.N. Simonie 
also have the similar view when they define national 
security as "that part of the government policy having as 
its objective the creation of national and international 
political conditions favourable to the protection or 
extension of vital national values against existing and 
potential adversaries. In view of this security may be 
defined as "ability of a nation to protect its national 
values from external threats." The earliest studies of 
national security tend to concentrate on military threats 
arising from beyond the borders . 
According to Walter Lippmann's definition of 
national security "A nation is secure to the extent to 
which it is not in danger of having to sacrifice core 
values if it wishes to avoid war, and is able, if 
challenged to maintain them by victory in such war . It 
appears that the security of a nation is closely tied with 
the ability of a nation to deter an attack or to defend 
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itself successfully if attacked. This overwhelming 
military character of security is based on the assumption 
that principal threats to security comes from beyond the 
border of a nation.This excessively militarised character 
9 
of national security has been severely criticised by many 
on the ground that national security, if defined merely in 
military terms, portrays a profoundly wrong image of the 
concept , as it draws attention away from the non-
military threats which could be even more harmful and 
dangerous to the security of the nations-*- . Besides this 
it also motivates the nations for their excessive 
militarization which in the long run may only increase 
international insecurity, which is, inturn, bound to add 
to the insecurity of all nations. 
The conceptualization of national security, merely 
in terms of external military threats, fails to capture 
the large variety of problem facing the nations, 
particularly the Third World nations. In addition to all 
this it also gives the impression that meaning of security 
lies only in the absence of external military threats. 
Military has, no doubt, its own value to security of a 
nation to the extent that it is required for the 
elimination of coercive sources of threats to security but 
it does not serve a better meaning of the idea of national 
security. A broader view of national security encompassing 
its social, political, economic, and military dimensions 
gives an enduring meaning to the idea of national security 
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because national security can not be maintained and 
achieved unless and until the social, economic, and 
political life of the nation is sustained. 
The newly independent countries of the Third World, 
besides being subjected to pressures arising out of 
external threat, gets further undermined by big internal 
or domestic threats emanating from within the country. At 
the root of the internal security problem lies the issue 
of economic disparities and social inequalities. Even the 
threat of external intervention, and the foreign initiated 
political instability is possible because of internal 
weakness arising out of socio-economic imbalances and 
maladies. In most of the Third World countries, internal 
political instability is as much as a threat to vital 
national values as threats that originate externally. 
The threats to the security of a nation have both 
internal or external dimension, but whether the threats 
are internal or external both undermine the security of 
the nation as well as the security of its inhabitants as 
their security is interlinked with the security of the 
nation. As for Hobbes,"it did not much matter whether 
threats come from within or outside one's nations. A 
victim is just as dead if the bullet that kills him is 
fired by a neighbour attempting to seize his property as 
if it comes from an invading army. A citizen looks to the 
state, therefore, for protection against both type of 
threats". National Security has no meaning in the 
103 
absence of some threat identification . National security 
reflects the threat emanating from socio-economic 
problems, the threat may manifest in the internal erosion 
of legitimacy or the external manipulation of socio-
economic factors. In any discussion of a security there 
has to be implicit or explicit determination of threat. 
There are various inter-related factors which, directly or 
indirectly, implicitly or explicitly affect the threat 
perception of a state, and they may include strategic 
position, alliances, national economy, national resources, 
nationl will and capability, self sufficiency, internal 
cohesion, political legitimacy etc. 
b.India's Threat Perceptions 
At the outset a few fundamental issues need 
examination. India has always approached the subject of 
security in its larger framework, beyond that implicit in 
defence and military forces. The concept of security has 
involved the preservation and perpetuation of the core 
values fundamental to the Indian nation state, value 
revolving around democratic norms, a secular society, a 
federal polity, moral and ethical values, fundamental 
equal human rights and last but not least, national 
strength and power. These values had shaped the Indian 
civilization and they provide the foundations on which 
modern India can be built taking into account the 
historical socio-economic inequities and the regional 
disparities at the time India became independent, it is 
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only through the adoption and pursuit of these values that 
internal dissonances could be kept within reasonable 
limits and the turbulence of a traditional society in 
transition to modern industrialised development managed. 
When these core values are closely scrutinised in relation 
to the core values adopted by states in our vicinity, one 
finds many elements of contrasts and contradictions which 
lead to dissonances and friction in the security 
environment. 
In contrast to its liberal democratic system, most 
of the countries in India's neighbourhood have chosen the 
path of praetorianism and authoritarianism of different 
kinds; in contrast to its secularism, many countries have 
adopted the unitary religious basis of the nation state, 
leading some to varying shades of fundamentalism. More 
often than not states in its neighbourhood have been ruled 
by elites with a narrow decision-making base and 
questionable legitimacy in the eyes of their own people. 
This, in turn, has led to problems of regime legitimacy 
where ruling elites have opted for confrontational 
relation to sustain themselves in power. All these 
certainly have some effect on our security environment. 
The Indian threat and its threat perception are a 
complex affair. Not surprisingly, there is a dialectical 
link between the perception of the Indian threat created 
by Indian national security policies, by neighbours and 
countries near and far and the threat India itself 
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perceives. This was most aptly stated in a report of the 
Australian Senate's standing Committee on Foreign Affairs 
Defence and Trade: "India is already the predominant 
military power in South Asia. Its capability is already 
very powerful. The continued expansion of that capability 
over the next dacade will probably produce not only the 
security of India's South Asian neighbours but also that 
of India itself as its neighbours respond to the military 
build-up."^^ 
This statement rightly manifests the concept of 
security dilemma, introduced by John Herz, who states 
that the self help attempts of the nations to look after 
their own security, lead to the rising insecurity for 
other nations as each nation interprets its own actions as 
defensive and the actions of others as potentially 
threatening. 
For a long time India remained without any security 
perspective of its own due to different reasons, mainly 
because India remained under alien control or it remained 
politically heterogeneous.-'-^ Given its public posture, the 
Indian ruling elite has fought shy of providing any 
prioritized threat perception at any given point in time. 
Even when the conflict with China was building up in the 
1950s, the official posture towards China was one of 
friendship. Part of this behaviour stems from the 
nonaligned posture adopted by free India which has 
militated against adopting an adversarial posture towards ^ 
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anyone. Mindless non-alignment has some times even been 
carried into the inner working of the government 
debilitating policy formulation for national security. 
Shortly after independence in 1947, Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru had argued that peace and security were 
not just obtained through military buildups and alliances 
systems, but also through skillful diplomatic policies and 
efforts to forge friendships with other countries, 
especially those with different political and economic 
systems.-^^ Till the establishment of a moth-eaten National 
Security Council in August 1990, the country lacked an 
institutionalised mechanism to even address the problem. 
In these circumstances the most obvious means of 
defining a threat perception has been to look at a map and 
factor in history. Precolonial history saw threats arise 
across the northern and north-western border. Subsequent 
to the western ascendancy, threats have come from across 
the sea. Free India has seen threats emerging from both 
sources. The Chinese and Pakistani threats have come from 
the north and north-west. 
India today is faced with an extensive defence and 
security perimeter; over 16,500 km of land borders, 
including nearly 7,000 km of borders with states with 
which significant territorial disputes still persists; a 
7,600 km long coastline and 2.5 million sq.km of Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) to protect, besides over 500 islands, 
most of them separated from the mainland by as much as 
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1,400 km; increasing stakes in off-shore resources of 
hydrocarbons and trade across the seas; presence of extra-
regional military forces and command and control 
infrastructures in the Indian Ocean region linking many 
littoral states into great power strategic consensus and 
inevitable vortex of greatpower rivalries, competition, 
and tensions. The borders and hence the defence perimeter-
span some of the world's most difficult terrains in the 
Himalayas to the North, the mountainous tropical jungles 
in the East, as also the deserts and marshes to the West, 
and the densely populated areas of the borders at either 
end of the Indo-Gangetic plains of India. 
The British were the first who had realised the 
threats to India's security from external aggression. 
However, they imposed their own threat perceptions on 
India. India became the centre of an empire system and its 
soldiers policed the region from Ethiopia to China. But 
India was also the southern tier of the defence of the 
Home islands and the southern tier of the defence 
against Czarist expansionism. The British obsession with 
the Great Game arguably took India to Central Asia and 
laid the ground work for the subsequent clash with China. 
Independence led to the blocking of the access of 
India to the west- to Afghanistan and Iran and the 
traditional routes of invasion. With the withdrawal of 
British, India was no doubt granted independence, but it 
paid heavy price for it, as it was divided into two 
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sovereign but mutually hostile countries viz India and 
Pakistan, who have wasted their resources not only to 
weaken each other but to the whole Indian subcontinent. 
Imniediately after partition the Indian subcontinent 
witnessed the military operation, though the mild 
intensity, in 1947-48 in Jammu and Kashmir. This was 
followed by India's military operation in Goa. The 
beginning of 1960s was marked by the Sino-Indian conflict 
which made the Indian leaders to realise their follies in 
the diplomatic as well as the defence fields. In this 
context, the 1962 Chinese invasion over India is regarded 
as blessing in disguise for the latter as it was proved 
in 1965 India-Pakistan War. In 1971 again India had to 
move its forces into the battle field to fight against the 
armed forces of Pakistan, where India emerged successful 
both from the military and diplomatic point of view as it 
smoothened the process of creating changes in the 
political map of the world by adding a new sovereign state 
of Bangladesh to it. Thereafter no such war took place in 
the subcontinent except some mild border skirmishes. 
c.The Chinese Threat 
It should be pointed out that Pakistan is one of 
the factors, and not the only factor in the security 
calculations of India. While discussing India's security 
problem or its threat perception one can hardly ignore 
China as a critical factor. ~~ ' -
China's policies, strategies and tactics have 
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exercised-and continue to exercise-a major impact on 
India's security. The sharing of a common border of more 
than 2,000 miles which become alive as a consequence of 
China's liberation of Tibet in 1950; the bilateral border 
dispute and China's initiation of a border war to realize 
its territorial claims in 1962; China's effort to play a 
dominant role in Asia by constraining India in South Asia 
and seeking hegemony in South East Asia; the solidarity 
with and encouragement to insurgents of both revolutionary 
and ethnic minority denominations; the logical 
consequences of Chin"a's emergence as a nuclear weapons-
power; and the drive to enhance its status in the 
international system by the choice of strategic linkages 
with one super-power or the other in accordance with 
perceived national needs, and its linkages with Pakistan, 
with whom India has adversarial relations from very day of 
its inception as sovereign state, constitute the critical 
components of China's security framework which exercise an 
impact on India's security, 
China continues to occupy 38,000 sq. km of Indian 
territory, lays claim to another 90,000 sq, km of it 
besides the 10,000 sq.kni of Indian territory illegally 
ceded to it by Pakistn. In spite of Indian efforts to find 
a reasonable solution to the territorial problem (wrongly 
perceived as a "border" dispute) there has been scant 
willingness displayed by china towards definitive measures 
for the resolution of the issue. There is also little 
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evidence of China having given up its traditional faith in 
the role and function of force, and the philosophy of 
"teaching lessons" as indeed witnessed in the use of force 
in the South China Sea and extension of support to Khamer 
Rouge. Given the problems facing its leadership, and the 
shifts towards a more conservative ideological posture, 
great uncertainties exist concerning Chinese policies in 
future. It has to be remembered that rapid shifts in 
Chinese policies have taken place in the past; and at this 
stage the phenomenon cannot be ruled out for future. 
More specific concerns arise out of China's 
military modernization, supported politically and 
technologically by the West, especially the U.S. China's 
military capabilities which had been on the decline 
through the 1960s and 1970s have grown remarkably during 
the 1980s. Major changes have been introduced in 
doctrinal, training and manpower, institutional and 
technological fields. The success of Chinese military 
modernisation by the turn of the century would almost 
certainly alter the correlation of power at least in Asia 
(if not the whole world) especially if no other power is 
able or willing to provide a countervailing influence, 
particularly with regard to the use of military power for 
a coercive role. 
The Chinese connection in Pakistan's search for 
strategic parity with India can not be ignored either. 
China extended its full support in arming and training 
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Pakistan's armed forces against India and still helping 
Pakistan's defence infrastructure to acquire self 
sufficiency. According to some US media reports, China has 
provided Pakistan with precise nuclear weapons design as 
well as missile technology.-^^ China has served a useful 
purpose in off setting India's perceived regional 
superiority. 
In the 1965 war China issued a not-so-transparent 
ultimatum to India to ensure that India did not move some 
of its divisions facing China to the battle-front. 
Immediately following the war, when both India and 
Pakistan were embargoed by the west, China began its 
conventional arms transfer relationship that has been of 
substantial benefit to Pakistan. As part of this, China 
has since 1972 supplied some 1200 Type -59 tanks, 105 mm, 
122 mm, 130 mm towed artillery, patrol and missile craft, 
MIG-19 and MIG-21 type aircraft. Reported to be on the 
order books were Romeo class submarines, portable SAMs, 
and T-69 MBTs.^^ 
For India the spectre of China and the Chinese war 
has been a pressing one. The Chinese strategic alliance 
with the United States and Pakistan has given India the 
distinction of having had run-ins with three nuclear armed 
adversaries. The Indian reaction to the Chinese nuclear 
explosion in 1964 was guite mild. However it did attempt 
unsuccessfully to obtain a Soviet-US umbrella against the 
Chinese nuclear threat19. j ^ ^^^ ^^^ „g attempt to 
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browbeat India on the Bangladesh issue with Chinese help 
in 1971 that touched off the Indian "peaceful nuclear 
explosion" in 1974. But the Indian ability was almost 
certainly the consequence of the Chinese nuclear 
capability.^° 
d.The Pakistan Factor in India's Security 
The sub-continental heartland area marked by 
Pakistan's hostility towards India is a permanent threat 
in the security perspective of India. Pakistan supported 
by the Arab finances and Western arms, possesses the 
capability of imposing permanent state of preparedness for 
war on India. The Indian failure to establish peace and 
security in the region either by developing cordial 
relations or by use of force have created situations 
beyond control. 
Any time Pakistan feels militarily strong or has 
uncontrollable internal political situation may impose a 
war on India to test.their military strength or to divert 
the public attention from their internal problems. 
Moreover, Pakistan, on account of its self created fear of 
psychological and cultural dominance by India, tries to 
win the support of the Chinese who consider India to be 
their main rival in the regional leadership. Their 
combined anti-India policy keeps India busy and occupied 
with the threat, so that India remains involved in solving 
petty internal problems and border disputes, rather than 
playing any significant role in the International and 
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global politics. 
Individually, Pakistan cannot pose any danger to 
India's security but its collaboration with any outside 
power may cause worry for India. It may practically be 
impossible for India to dislodge any power from its 
territory, particularly if the invading power (India's 
neighbour adversaries) is supported or assisted by any of 
the big powers. It is well known that Pakistan with the 
feeling of self imposed insecurity, first secured the 
membership of Western military alliances and latter 
developed politico-military relations with China. The 
American support to Pakistan during the 1965 and 1971 
Indo-Pakistan Wars is too fresh to be forgotten. With the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan American decision to 
supply unproportionately arms to Pakistan under the 
pretext of strengthening the latter against the Soviet 
Union without giving sufficient assurance to India. 
It is important, with regard to Pakistan, to note 
that, Pakistan has not only been ruled by military, 
directly and indirectly, for most of its existence, 
military power has been a predominant element in its 
foreign policy. Conventional wisdom have led us to believe 
that it maintains a military capability well beyond that 
it needs for defence or can afford because of a threat 
from India. It is on record of history that since 1947 it 
was always Pakistan that initiated military aggression, 
that at no stage India has tried to threaten Pakistan. The 
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War in 1971 resulted from West Pakistan's elites refusing 
to accept the verdict of the first general election and 
then letting loose military repression in East Pakistan 
resulting in violence (and ten million refugees) spilling 
over into India. Even then, the conflict in the West was 
initiated by Pakistan by its surprise air attack on five 
major air fields in India on December 3, 1971. The growth 
of Pakistan's military power, therefore has to be seen in 
the context of the potential risk of aggression, as indeed 
happened in 1947 and 1965. Pakistan, inspite of reduced 
security needs after the emergence of Bangladesh, set 
about expanding its armed forces significantly well before 
the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 
On the otherhand, Pakistan has certain advantages. 
Pakistan's military doctrine is based on "offensive-
defensive strategy". This would enable Pakistan to choose 
the time and place of a surprise attack. Since the 
Pakistani cantonments are closer to their border 
positions, it is easier for them to mobilize their troops. 
India's battle formations are not near to the border areas 
and are located in cantonments in the central regions of 
the country, and its reaction time to a Pakistani surprise 
move will be considerably more. 
By keeping alive the Kashmir guestion and equating 
it with Palestine, Pakistan retains another military 
option to arm guerillas and send them to Kashmir in the 
name of liberation. This is also in line with Pakistan's 
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past behaviour in 1947-48 and 1965, when such a strategy 
was subsequently followed by a full scale armed invasion. 
e.U. S. Military Aid to Pakistan:Implications on India's 
Security 
Pakistan by itself has never been and will never be 
a serious threat to Indian security. It is only after 
acquiring massive arms aid from the USA that the balance 
of power started telling in its favour, which certainly 
has a direct bearing on India's security. India's 
opposition to Pakistan's membership of the Western 
2 1 
alliance system needs to be seen from this perspective 
India's foreign policy therefore, came to be one of 
insulating the subcontinent from the external powers. 
The assessment of the threat created by the US 
arming of Pakistan, despite conflicting and concurrent 
goals and interests between them, has to be essentially 
based on the extent of arms and the military equipment 
supplied by the US to Pakistan along with its 
sophistication in pursuance of the American policy of 
using Pakistan as a potential instrument^^ for moving 
towards Asia to achieve extrovert and strategic economic 
interests. Pakistan's enmity towards India and its past 
history of aggressiveness are other factors to be reckon 
with. Infact the US military aid encourages Pakistan in 
its aggressiveness. Aggression commited against India in 
the past by Pakistan was only made possible by the US 
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23 arms. 
It is interesting to notice that although Pakistan 
affirmed its commitment to the building of a climate of 
peace and cooperation in the sub-continent through the 
Simla Agreement, simultaneously it also pursued policies 
aimed at strengthening its military strategic linkages 
with the United States and China. It is true that during 
the period under study (1980-91) Pakistani threat did not 
materialize in the form of a war, but the massive 
rearmamemt programme heightened India's perception of 
threat from Pakistan. The fear was that the newly acquired 
arms would be used ih the event of a conflict as in 1965 
and 1971. 
Feeling of insecurity in India is also on account 
of the fact that Pakistani leaders had publically 
confessed that their alliance with the United States and 
membership of the various defence pacts (SEATO and CENTO) 
had little to do with the avowed objects of the pacts to 
contain international communism.^'* Rather Pakistani object 
was merely to strengthen itself against India, atleast in 
order to be able to settle its disputes with India from a 
position of strength. The Indian fears as to the aim of 
Pakistan in joining the military pacts seems to be 
confirmed when the SEATO council in March 1956 and the 
Baghdad Pact council in the month following urged the need 
for the early settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which had 
nothing to do with ostensible object of the pacts, and in 
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which "international communism" was at all an issue. 
When Pakistani leaders found that these military pacts 
would not go all the way to settle the various disputes 
with India, they demanded Pakistan's withdrawal from the 
military pacts. 
Infact, whenever there was no stable democratic 
leadership in Pakistan such as during the Ayub Khan and 
Yahya Khan regimes, these military dictators diverted the 
attention of Pakistani people from their oppressive 
dictatorship by imposing an armed invasion on India. And 
the induction of sophisticated armaments into a "troubled 
area" like Pakistan under a leadership lacking strong base 
holds in it the seeds of a threat to Indian security and 
could be cause of instability and threat to peace in the 
region as a whole.^^ The massive arms buildup which is 
specifically in the nature of improving its defensive 
capabilities to launch a "blitzkrieg" type of war offers 
Pakistan a tempting opportunity to seek a way out of its 
growing difficulties.^^ A similar situation arose when Zia 
came into power in Pakistan through a military coup. 
The theory propounded by Pakistan is that its 
defence capability must correspond to the size of threat 
it faced and not to the size of its territory and 
population.28 No doubt, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan 
actually posed a grave threat to the peace and security of 
the region which was. quite often projected by Pakistan, 
but most of the weapon systems inducted by Pakistan can 
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not be used in Pakistan's northern or western theatres and 
secondly the improved strength of Pakistani navy through 
supplies of sophisticated weaponry has no relation to the 
situation in Afghanistan.^^ It has been pointed out that 
the equipment provided was not appropriate for fighting in 
the mountain areas which was needed to check a Soviet or 
Chinese move through the Himalayas, rather the arms 
provided to Pakistan consisted of tanks, motorized 
artillery etc. which could be used only on a relatively 
flat terrain, in other words, according to Chester Bowles, 
"on the plain of North India".^° 
Selig S. Harrison, a senior Associate of the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has argued that 
F-16 and 155 mm howitzers are not suitable for the Afghan 
frontiers, to meet the Soviet challenge. He emphasized 
that if America was seriously interested in Pakistan's 
defence vis-a-vis USSR, it should have offered F-5G to it 
because that was more suitable in those circumstances. In 
the opinion of the defence experts F-5Gs would not enhance 
the striking capability of Pakistan against India. ^-'-
The official Pakistani justification for the supply 
of E-2 Hawkeye is to counter airspace violations at the 
Afghan border has low credibility because AEW aircraft 
would be ineffective for this mission owing to the 
topographyof the border full of mountain ranges and long 
reaction time for the interceptor aircraft flying from the 
current location of Pakistani airfields. They would on the 
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otherhand be effective for monitoring Indian parts of 
airspace.-^^ The fact remains that Pakistan still maintains 
a formidable armed forces ( as much as 85 percent of its 
army) on its eastern border facing India, even though they 
are fully aware that Indian forces by and large are spread 
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over the cantonments of south and central India, which 
strengthen the possibility of its use against India. 
To appreciate the implications of the weapons 
acquired by Pakistan or proposed weapons, it would be 
desirable to understand the basic characteristics and 
capabilities of weapons to be provided to Pakistan under 
the package deal. Firstly about the AWACS, the airborne 
warning and control system has the option ranging from E-
3A "sentry" to E-2C "Hawkeye" and even tethered balloons. 
An airborne surveillance and tracking radar like one on an 
AWACS, significantly increases the capability to track low 
flying aircraft and also negates most of the hostile 
electronic warfare capability. "An AWACS of the E-3A 
sentry type inservice with the US Air Force is believed to 
be able to track low flying aircraft out to a radius of 
nearly 470 KM and track targets at higher altitudes to 
even greater ranges, at the same time guiding friendly 
interceptors to positions of advantage to shoot down the 
adversaries",34_ Regarding the E-2C "Hawkeye", "th 
dramatic shooting down of 86 Syrian fighters by Israel 
over the Baga's valley for the probable loss of one 
aircraft in June 1986 in a matter of hours was largely due 
e 
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to the surveillance and control through the Isceali E-2C 
Hawkeyes stationed over the Mediterranean sea". ^ 
Secondly, regarding the M-1 tanks, these are 
considered to be the most advanced in the world. The tank 
is equipped with the laser systems to guide its shells. 
The range finder gives a 100 percent accuracy in 
destroying enemy tanks. This tank is much more advanced 
than the Main Battle Tanks (MBT), Indis is developing as 
its next generation tank. M-1 Abrams has a dual firing 
capability of 105 mm and 120 mm, has a cruising range of 
440 KM and carries a 1500 horse power turbine engine. 
India is particularly concerned about the supply of 
F-16 NATO model offensive aircraft which has far greater 
technological superiority over the fighter bombers that 
India has and bring a larger number of Indian cities 
within its range of striking capability. The deployment of 
F-16 might cause inestimable damage to India's airfields, 
oil and nuclear installations, military depots and might 
involve the loss of lives of civilians. The superiority of 
F-16 has been established when it was used by Israel in 
destroying nuclear plant of Irag. It is in this context 
India seriously viewed the US proposal to sell E-2c 
Hawkeye airborne warning and control system aircraft to 
Pakistan. It is true that the Indian Air Force is 
stronger than that of Pakistan; neverthless, the 
tremendous striking power of the Hawkeye has become a 
source of anxiety to its defence, it can keep India's 
Offensive power at bay and weaken its defence. 
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Though India has reiterated that given its 
"military potential" and sound defence infrastructure, it 
is not afraid of a defeat at the hands of Pakistan, its 
apprehension lay in probable irrational deployment of US 
sophisticated weaponry acquired by Pakistan. For want of 
self-restraint, Pakistan might use them without conceiving 
the serious conseqences both to itself and India. It is in 
this context that India opposed the supply of 
sophisticated weapons to Pakistan. 
Therefore, the arms aid given by the USA in the 
name of peace and security of the region and for the 
"containment of communism" is a threat to Indian security. 
According to a leading Pakistani military thinker, Lt. 
Gen. A.I. Akram (Retd) the main military threat to India, 
if it is there comes from Pakistan. He said, "there is no 
serious threat to India from China because there can not 
be a great war in Himalayas and the peninsular south India 
was out of the invasion course." 
The new security linkages between the US and 
Pakistan had created "a fear of super power intervention in 
the future regional conflict. Because, in order to acquire 
additional sophisticated weaponry, Pakistan could provide 
bases to the US and thereby it would be an instrument of 
intervention in the South Asian region. Moreover the 
presence of the US navy in the Indian Ocean and the 
creation of CENTCOM which has jurisdiction for operations 
over wide region in the Ocean's littoral and hinterland 
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areas from Pakistan to Kenya has further increased the 
possibility of US intervention in the future regional 
conflicts. In this context, the former US ambassador to 
Pakistan, Dean Hinton asserted that the US would also come 
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to Pakistan's help if India committed aggression. 
Any discussion of the Pakistani threat to India's 
security would be incomplete without reference to that 
country's nuclear weapon programme which engaged the 
attention of the Pakistani decision makers roughly from 
the late sixties onwards. Crucial to our discussion of 
Pakistan's nuclear weapon programme is its implications to 
India's security and power position in the region. One of 
the initial conseguences of the possession of bomb by 
Pakistan would be the sense of psychological insecurity 
that it would inject into the Indian decision making 
elite. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by Pakistan 
would upset the military balance and the resultant nuclear 
asymmetrical situation would make it difficult for India 
to safeguard its security against any possible use of 
nuclear weapons by Pakistan.^^ Secondly, the Kashmir 
question might be activised. Pakistan might either decide 
to make use of the bomb to settle the dispute'^^ or resort 
to a diplomatic use of the same to get more concession 
from India, finally the significance of the nuclear threat 
is to be understood in the context of the heightened 
security concerns of India's decision makers as a result 
Of the narrowing down of the gap between the two countries 
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conventional military strength.'^ •'-
Infact, smaller nations which by themselves may not 
be capable of posing a threat to bigger neighbours can 
become instruments of interventionism for the Great 
Powers. In the context of Indo-Pakistan relations and in 
analysing the threat from Pakistan, India can not deal 
with Pakistan merely as a small country but has to reckon 
with all the politico-military linkages it has acquired 
such as with the Islamic World, China and more importantly 
with the US. Here lies the real threat of US-Pakistan-
china axis trying to cut India down to size. 
The security environment of India has deteriorated 
due to Pakistan's military buildup and led to a sense of 
insecurity in India. The acquisition of massive and highly 
sophisticated arms by Pakistan is beyond its legitimate 
defence needs. The weapon systems such as E-2C Hawkeye 
airborne warning and control system, updated F-16 fighter 
aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, the Vulcan-Phalanx 
air defence equipment and the Mohawk battlefield 
surveillance aircraft, all act as "force multipliers" 
bestowing a capability to Pakistan to entertain aggression 
against India.^^ 
The introduction of such a new generation of 
weapons in the subcontinent places India "a decade behind 
in the weaponry", which would affect the existing 
balance. •^•' The then Minister of State for Defence Shivraj 
Patil asserted that "the induction of such a large volume 
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of advanced technology weapons systems in a compressed 
time-frame is bound to tilt the military balance in favour 
of Pakistan. While we understand the sovereign right of 
every country to acquire arms, India could not but feel 
disturbed about the threat to subcontinental peace and 
stability implicit in acquisition by Pakistan of 
sophisticated weapon systems which provokes an arms race 
by raising the level of prevalent military technology". 
Past experiences show that US military aid to 
Pakistan not only emboldened it but also encouraged to 
launch aggression against India. It is an accepted fact 
that in 1947-48, and in 1965, it was Pakistan which took 
the initiative and forced war on India. One can also say 
that Pakistan forced the war on India in 1971, too, but if 
one analyses the facts and the events in an objective 
manner, the finger may be pointing towards India for 
instigating and starting the war with a grand strategy in 
view i.e. breaking of Pakistan. 
Now it is yet to be seen whether faced with the 
threat to its leadership, Pakistani leaders will try to 
hold the nation together by attacking India or Indian 
Government in order to overcome the internal security 
problems which pose a threat to its national integration, 
finds it politically more convenient to create border 
skirmishes and create warphobia of a Pakistani threat. 
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CONCLUSION 
On the basis of discussion in the preceding 
chapters one can now attempt to present an overall view of 
the evolution of US-Pakistan alliance relations and draw 
some broad conclusions about the factors responsible for 
shaping the nature of those relations and likely elements 
of continuity and change in the relations between the two 
countries in the forseeable future. One can also draw some 
conclusion about the implications on India's security of 
such alliance relationship and underlying US military aid 
to Pakistan. 
The US-Pakistan relations over the years have 
followed an uneven course with several ups and downs. 
Various stages-initial hesitation, alignment, detachment, 
tilt, disenchantment , the realignment and redetachment 
have been the hallmark of this bilateral relationship. 
The US foreign policy in the post World War II 
period almost revolved around single dominant objective-
the containment of international communism all over the 
world. And military aid did become the significant tool in 
achieving this foreign policy objective. 
The United States having checked the advance of 
communism in Europe, was now turning its attention towards 
Asia. India and Pakistan were the two Asian countries 
which could play an important role by allying themselves 
with the USA in its fight against communism. In the early 
years, the American policy-makers showed comparatively 
129 
greater preference for India than Pakistan. But India's 
policy of nonaligninent and its reluctance to associate 
itself with US foreign policy objectives of containing 
communism led it to conclude an alliance with Pakistan, 
which was also in a frantic search for an ally who could 
guarantee its security vis-a-vis India. Thus both needed 
each other, though with divergent policy perception and 
orientations. The United States was guided by its global 
policy of containing international communism, and Pakistan 
was motivated by problem of national security and defence. 
Pakistan's foreign policy-makers took advantage of 
the many opportunities inherent in the cold war 
environment by using the right rhetoric in the right place 
and at the right time. Contrary to India, Pakistan 
extended full support to the US stand during the war in 
Korea and subsequently when the latter signed peace treaty 
with Japan, The outright opposition of India and 
Pakistan's unequivocal support at critical juncture when 
U.S. prestige was at stake, certainly left a deep 
impression on the mind of Americans. All these 
developments led to the US estrangement from India and 
friendship towards Pakistan. 
Pakistans's unprincipled adhoc policies kept it 
running for support all over the world to bolster its 
military and political strength vis-a-vis India. It 
witnessed the failure of democacy at home only few years 
after its birth, under military dictatorships. It joined 
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CENTO and SEATO in the mid-fifties, concluded an arms pact 
with the United States in 1954, used US arms against India 
in the 1965 war the arms that were primarily meant for use 
against the communist countries. And when during the war 
the US placed an embargo on the supply of arms it 
established a new military relationship with communist 
China which became its main supplier of arms in the late 
sixties and seventies. In frustration it joined the non-
aligned group of nations when neither the capitalists nor 
the communist China could help it overcome its civil war 
crisis in 1971 or could save the consequent dismemberment 
of its eastern wing. It accepted Simla agreement with 
India to solve mutual problems peacefully and bilaterally, 
but when the Soviet troops entered Afghanistan in December 
1979 it could not resist the temptation of acquiring 
afresh massive US arms aid-once again to bolster its 
military might vis-a-vis India and in return paid the 
price of compromising its freedom of action by granting 
facilities to the US in accordance with the latter's 
strategic requirements. 
Infact, Pakistan's entire policies, both in theory 
as well as in practice, have revolved around an obsession 
with India from which emanates its threat perception that 
India which did not relish partition in 1947 is determined 
to destroy it. Unfortunately the conviction has grown 
stronger when India, dragged by circumstances into 
Pakistan's civil war, was portrayed as chiefly 
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instrumental in the loss of East Pakistan in December 
1971. US-Pakistan relations received a serious 
setback in April 1979 when the US Congress passed the 
Symington-Glenn Amendment to Security Assistance Act, 
which forbade US military and economic aid to any country 
engaged in acquisition or production of nuclear weapons, 
Pakistan fell into this forbidden category with the result 
that all military aid to Pakistan was frozen. 
The fall of the Shah regime in Iran in the 
beginning of 1979 and the Soviet military intervention in 
Afghanistan in the same year, however, rekindled American 
interest in Pakistan, which now came to be regarded as a 
"frontline state". The ban imposed on US security 
assistance to Pakistan was repealed so that the Afghan 
insurgents could be helped. The renewed US interest in 
Pakistan was reflected in its $ 400 million aid offer, 
which was rejected by Pakistan's president General Zia, 
saying it as mere "peanuts". President Zia, infact, 
thought that the leaders of the United States were in a 
state of panic after the Soviet intervention in 
Afghanistan and that was an opportune time for him to 
extract the maximum commitment from them. 
Infact Gen Zia, who had earlier rejected the $ 400 
V 
million Carter Government's offer describing it as 
peanuts, had established a new security relationship with 
the US to obtain a $ 3.2 billion military and economic aid 
package to be spread over 1981-87. Similarly the US 
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Congress cleared another $ 4.2 billion military and 
economic aid package for Pakistan for a second spell of 
six years (1987-92). Under these military and economic aid 
programmes, Pakistan received many sophisticated and 
dreaded weapons, including F-16 fighters, from the USA. 
It is interesting to notice that the weapons 
provided to Pakistan by the USA were not appropriate for 
fighting in the mountain areas which was needed to check a 
Soviet or Chinese move through the Himalyas, rather the 
arms provided to Pakistan could be used only on a 
relatively flat terrain, possibly against India. 
So far as India's security is concerned Pakistan by 
itself has never been and will never be a serious threat 
to India's security. It is only after acquiring massive 
arms from the USA, that tilt the delicately poised balance 
in the region in favour of Pakistan, which certainly has a 
direct bearing on India's security. It is true that during 
the period under study (1980-91) Pakistani threat did not 
materialize in the form of a war, but the massive 
rearmament programme heightened India's perception of 
threat from Pakistan. 
However, in a surprise move the US administration 
on October 1, 1990 suspended all military and economic aid 
to Pakistan under the 1985 Pressler Amendment, followong 
renewed fears that Pakistan had developed a nuclear 
weapon. This aid restriction still continues because 
Washington, with the end of cold war, is no longer quite 
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willing to turn a blind eye on Pakistan's nuclear 
programme, as it used to do during the cold war period. 
Pakistani Government has been making constant efforts to 
overcome the Pressler Amendment that once again it can 
acquire the remainder of the F-16 fighters for which it 
has already paid-but without any success. The ball is 
clearly in American Court. 
The degree and extent of future American assistance 
to Pakistan would depend on various factors. These include 
US priorities in the allocation and commitment of its 
resources, the utility of Pakistan to promote US foreign 
policy objectives and so on. Pakistan had lost its 
relevance to the US politico-strategic concerns, when it 
ceased to be a frontline state at the end of the Cold War. 
It has once again become important to American policy 
makers. There could be three reasons for the change in the 
US attitudes: first, to check the growing influence of 
India and pre-empt the emergence of a possible China-Iran-
India axis; second, Pak geo-political proximity to the 
Central Asian republics and the Middle East; third, the US 
need to garner support of a "moderate" Muslim country, in 
view of its antagonistic relations with "fundamentalist" 
Iran. Keeping in view all these factors, although a repeal 
of the Pressler Amendment is unlikely to get through the 
Congress, but the threat of its one-time waiver still 
looms. 
The future course of US-Pak relations would also 
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depend on whether the interests of the two countries are 
complementary or divergent. It seems that the United 
States may give one-time waiver if Pakistan agreed to be 
capped. During Talbott's visit to Pakistan capping was the 
starting point for discussions, which matured into putting 
the existing stockpile under international control and 
bringing the facility for enrichment of uranium of weapon 
grade under safeguards. Both the countries have agreed to 
proceed with further consideration of the US initiative, 
which is designed to place a verifiable cap on the 
production of fissile materials. Whereas the US views the 
"verifiable cap" as a quid pro quo for the US offer of 
"enhanced cooperation with Pakistan in various fields", 
which includes evoking the "waiver", Pakistan looks at the 
capping issue as a support of regional non-proliferation. 
By situating itself as a partner in US efforts for 
global and more specifically regional non-proliferation, 
Pakistan perhaps seeks to mollify forces in the US who 
have criticized the administration's proposal for a one-
time waiver of the arms embargo. If the simultaneity and 
parity principles were to be effectively applied, in the 
longer term Pakistan could once again qualify to be 
recipient of sophisticated weaponry and thus equalize the 
conventional edge which India would otherwise enjoy. 
However, it looks doubtful that the US would be 
able to prevail upon Ms. Bhutto to dismantle Pak nuclear 
capability and even if it succeeds in taming her, the Army 
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would resist. The Chief of the Army Staff, Gen. Abdul 
Waheed had made it abundantly clear that his country 
would not barter its nuclear agenda for F-16s. Without 
mincing words, he declared that the Army would tell its 
political bosses where it stood on the issue. 
Any accretion of Pakistan's military capabilities 
will inevitably exacerbate tensions in the region. It will 
disturb the current arms equilibrium and lead to an arms 
race. There is an eerie suspicion that this is precisely 
what Washington covets in order to create a market for its 
weapons. It is not that Washington is unaware of the 
adverse impact on the security environment, but in its 
calculations, commercial considerations outweight qualms 
of conscience, if any, about escalation of conflict. 
Besides, the US policy-makers feel that they can browbeat 
India into signing on the dotted nuclear-nonproliferation 
line. That the ill-advised move will embolden Islamabad in 
its evil designs on Kashmir and mkae it more obdurate and 
perverse in its dealing with India is of little gravity 
to the US planners. 
It must be clearly understood that war is a costly, 
inhuman and an unreliable method of achieving national 
objectives. In the long run and in the interest of 
maintaining peace in the Indian sub-continent, it is of 
paramount importance, that India and Pakistan should learn 
to co-exist. All real or imaginary apprehensions, fears, 
suspicions, mistrust and irritants should be removed 
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through diplomacy, cooperation, negotiations and an 
attitude of give and take. The top leaders must establish 
personal rapport and set the pace for normalisation of 
relations between India and Pakistan, It is only then and 
then alone that a lasting peaceful relation can be 
ensured. Hence, a long-term objective of conciliation and 
friendship should not be lost sight of, which is essential 
for peaceful co-existence. 
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